39:4-36 Failure to yield to pedestrians, exceptions; violations, penalties.

39:4-36   Failure to yield to pedestrians, exceptions; violations, penalties.

39:4-36  a. The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except at crosswalks when the movement of traffic is being regulated by police officers or traffic control signals, or where otherwise regulated by municipal, county, or State regulation, and except where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided:

(1)The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a marked crosswalk, when the pedestrian is upon, or within one lane of, the half of the roadway, upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning.  As used in this paragraph, "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes conveying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway.

(2)No pedestrian shall leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield or stop.

(3)Whenever any vehicle is stopped to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

(4)Every pedestrian upon a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.

(5)Nothing contained herein shall relieve a driver from the duty to exercise due care for the safety of any pedestrian upon a roadway. Nothing contained herein shall relieve a pedestrian from using due care for his safety.

b.A person violating any paragraph of subsection a. of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, pay a fine to be imposed by the court in the amount of $200.  The court may also impose upon a person violating any paragraph of subsection a. of this section, a penalty of community service not to exceed 15 days in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate.  If the violation results in serious bodily injury to a pedestrian, the person convicted of the violation shall be subject to a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500, and may additionally be subject to a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 25 days, or a license suspension not to exceed six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.  As used in this section, "serious bodily injury" means serious bodily injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1.

c.Of each fine imposed and collected pursuant to subsection b. of this section, $100 shall be forwarded to the State Treasurer who shall annually deposit the moneys into the "Pedestrian Safety Enforcement and Education Fund" created by section 1 of P.L.2005, c.86 (C.39:4-36.2).

d.In the event of a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian within a marked crosswalk, or at an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, there shall be a permissive inference that the driver did not exercise due care for the safety of the pedestrian.

New Supreme Court appeal A-41-13 State v. Julie Kuropchak (072718)

New Supreme Court appeal A-41-13 State v. Julie Kuropchak (072718) 
In this appeal challenging a conviction of driving while intoxicated, was it error to admit the documentary evidence and the Alcotest reults, and was the observational evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction?
Certification granted:  11/13/13

TELEPHONIC REQUESTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS FOR BLOOD TESTS IN DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (DWI) CASES (MISSOURI V. MCNEELY) --RULE RELAXATION

NOTICE TO THE BAR

TELEPHONIC REQUESTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS FOR BLOOD TESTS IN DRIVING

WHILE INTOXICATED (DWI) CASES (MISSOURI V. MCNEELY) --RULE RELAXATION

The attached October 8, 2013 New Jersey Supreme Court order addresses the process

for telephonic requests for search warrants for nonconsensual blood tests in certain DWI cases

and is in response to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely,

__ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed. 2d 696 (2013). The order has a December 1, 2013

effective date.

In McNeely, the United States Supreme Court held “that in drunk-driving investigations,

the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every

case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” 185 L.Ed.2d at 715.

Further, “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be

determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 709.

The New Jersey Supreme Court order published with this notice relaxes and

supplements the Part III (Criminal) and Part VII (Municipal Court) Rules so as to authorize

certain Municipal Court judges to issue search warrants for nonconsensual blood testing in all

driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases where no indictable charge is anticipated, with the

Assignment Judge to designate either all of the Municipal Court judges in the county to have

this authority or just particular specified judges. Such authorization is not limited to evening or

weekend hours. Further, the search warrant may be issued in this limited category of cases by

a designated Municipal Court judge in person or by telephone, radio or other means of

electronic communication upon sworn oral testimony of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting

attorney communicated to the issuing judge, pursuant to the procedures outlined in R. 3:5-3(a)

and (b). Superior Court judges will handle search warrants for blood tests in those DWI cases

where an indictable charge is anticipated. The Supreme Court order does not affect any current

procedures for Municipal Court judges to issue in-person search warrants for other matters.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6

(2009), the attached Order also removes the requirement in R. 3:5-3(b) that exigent

circumstances must exist in order to issue search warrants by telephone, radio or other means

of electronic communication.

Further, the Order also asks the Supreme Court Criminal Practice Committee and

Municipal Court Practice Committee to consider and make recommendations regarding the

scope of authority for Municipal Court judges to issue telephonic search warrants in all cases.

/s/ Glenn A. Grant

_____________________________

Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D.

Acting Administrative Director of the Courts

Dated: November 14, 2013

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

It is ORDERED, pursuant to N.J. Const. Art. VI, sec. 2, par.3, that effective

December 1, 2013 and until further order, Part III (Criminal) and Part VII (Municipal

Court) of the Rules Governing the Court of the State of New Jersey are

supplemented and relaxed so as to permit Municipal Court judges, as designated by

the Assignment Judge, to issue search warrants for nonconsensual blood testing in

all driving-while-intoxicated cases where no indictable charge is anticipated; this

authorization is not limited to evening or weekend hours and such search warrants

may be issued in-person or by telephone, radio or other means of electronic

communication on the sworn oral testimony of a law enforcement officer or

prosecuting attorney communicated to the issuing judge, pursuant to the procedures

outlined in R. 3:5-3(a) and (b).

It is FURTHER ORDERED that R. 3:5-3(b) is also specifically relaxed so as to

remove the requirement that exigent circumstances must exist to issue a search

warrant by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s Criminal Practice Committee and

Municipal Court Practice Committee are asked to consider the scope of authority for

Municipal Court judges to issue telephonic/electronic search warrants in all cases

and to provide the Court with any proposed rule recommendations.

For the Court,

/s/ Stuart Rabner

Chief Justice

Dated: October 8, 2013

39:3-40 e Jail if driving while license suspended and accident where someone is injured

39:3-40 e Jail if   driving while license suspended and accident where someone is injured

 No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

(2)In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.

(3)In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:

(a)on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;

g.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2009, c.224);

h.A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person: 

(1)Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or

(2)Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the person's license was suspended or revoked.

In any case where a person who owns or leases a motor vehicle knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege of the person he permits to operate the motor vehicle is suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the person also shall be subject to the following penalties: for a first or second offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both; and for a third or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, and forfeiture of the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days;

i.If the violator's driver's license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10) or for failure to comply with a time payment order, the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has paid all fines and other assessments related to the parking violation that were the subject of the Order of Suspension, or if the violator makes sufficient payments to become current with respect to payment obligations under the time payment order;

j.If a person is convicted for a second or subsequent violation of this section and the second or subsequent offense involves a motor vehicle moving violation, the term of imprisonment for the second or subsequent offense shall be 10 days longer than the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.

For the purposes of this subsection, a "motor vehicle moving violation" means any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State for which motor vehicle points are assessed by the chief administrator pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1; 2002, c.28; 2007, c.187; 2009, c.224, s.1; 2009, c.332.