Arrested for DUI/DWI? Penalties in NJ

Arrested for DUI/DWI? Penalties in NJ

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets throughout New Jersey, including drivers charged with DUI/DWI and refusal. Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You will have to pay fines in court, or receive points on your driver's license. A conviction will require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. MVC [Division of Motor Vehicles] and have your license suspended. In New Jersey, the Judge does not have to rule that you were drunk. The prosecutor only needs to prove a driver was under the influence of alcohol. Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen offers information and can provide experienced attorney representation for Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations. When your driver's license is in jeopardy, or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Please schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter. Our website njlaws.com provides information on traffic offenses of which we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for Driving Under Influence and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations. In New Jersey Driving Under Influence (DUI) and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) are the same charge. The following is the new DWI law in New Jersey with all of its amendments: N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 Driving While Intoxicated 39:4-50. (a) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be subject: (1) For the first offense: (i) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or the or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone and acetate, amyl nitrite or amyl nitrate or their isomers, benzene, butyl alcohol, butyl nitrite, butyl nitrate or their isomers, ethyl acetate, ethyl alcohol, ethyl nitrite or ethyl nitrate, ethylene dichloride, isobutyl alcohol or isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, n-propyl alcohol, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, propyl nitrite or propyl nitrate or their isomers, toluene, toluol or xylene or any other chemical substance capable of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction or the dulling of the brain or nervous system as a result of the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of such chemical substance. Whenever an operator of a motor vehicle has been involved in an accident resulting in death, bodily injury or property damage, a police officer shall consider that fact along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section. A conviction of a violation of a law of a substantially similar nature in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction is a signatory to the Interstate Driver License Compact pursuant to P.L. 1966, c.73 (C. 39: 5D-1 et seq.), shall constitute a prior conviction under this subsection unless the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction in the other jurisdiction was based exclusively upon a violation of a proscribed blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.08%. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the forfeiture, suspension or revocation of the driving privilege imposed by the court under this section shall commence immediately, run through the offender's seventeenth birthday and continue from that date for the period set by the court pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection. A court that imposes a term of imprisonment for a first or second offense under this section may sentence the person so convicted to the county jail, to the workhouse of the county wherein the offense was committed, to an inpatient rehabilitation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or other facility approved by the chief of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit in the Department of Health and Senior Services. For a third or subsequent offense a person shall not serve a term of imprisonment at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center as provided in subsection (f). A person who has been convicted of a previous violation of this section need not be charged as a second or subsequent offender in the complaint made against him in order to render him liable to the punishment imposed by this section on a second or subsequent offender, but if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes. (b) A person convicted under this section must satisfy the screening, evaluation, referral, program and fee requirements of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, and of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers and a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The sentencing court shall inform the person convicted that failure to satisfy such requirements shall result in a mandatory two-day term of imprisonment in a county jail and a driver license revocation or suspension and continuation of revocation or suspension until such requirements are satisfied, unless stayed by court order in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, or R.S. 39:5-22. Upon sentencing, the court shall forward to the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit a copy of a person's conviction record. A fee of $100.00 shall be payable to the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and Enforcement Fund established pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 1983, c.531 (C. 26: 2B-32) to support the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. (c) Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person so convicted and forward such license or licenses to the chief administrator. The court shall inform the person convicted that if he is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties established in R.S. 39:3-40. The person convicted shall be informed orally and in writing. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40. In the event that a person convicted under this section is the holder of any out-of-State driver's license, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the chief administrator, who shall, in turn, notify appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, revoke the nonresident's driving privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State, in accordance with this section. Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall notify the person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties for a second, third or subsequent violation of this section. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of this section. (d) The chief administrator shall promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.) in order to establish a program of alcohol education and highway safety, as prescribed by this act. (e) Any person accused of a violation of this section who is liable to punishment imposed by this section as a second or subsequent offender shall be entitled to the same rights of discovery as allowed defendants pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. (f) The counties, in cooperation with the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse and the commission, but subject to the approval of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, shall designate and establish on a county or regional basis Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers. These centers shall have the capability of serving as community treatment referral centers and as court monitors of a person's compliance with the ordered treatment, service alternative or community service. All centers established pursuant to this subsection shall be administered by a counselor certified by the Alcohol and Drug Counselor Certification Board of New Jersey or other professional with a minimum of five years experience in the treatment of alcoholism. All centers shall be required to develop individualized treatment plans for all persons attending the centers; provided that the duration of any ordered treatment or referral shall not exceed one year. It shall be the center's responsibility to establish networks with the community alcohol and drug education, treatment and rehabilitation resources and to receive monthly reports from the referral agencies regarding a person's participation and compliance with the program. Nothing in this subsection shall bar these centers from developing their own education and treatment programs; provided that they are approved by the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. Upon a person's failure to report to the initial screening or any subsequent ordered referral, the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center shall promptly notify the sentencing court of the person's failure to comply. Required detention periods at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers shall be determined according to the individual treatment classification assigned by the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. Upon attendance at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, a person shall be required to pay a per diem fee of $75.00 for the first offender program or a per diem fee of $100.00 for the second offender program, as appropriate. Any increases in the per diem fees after the first full year shall be determined pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the person permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10% to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $250 nor more than $400 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of three months; (ii) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.10% or higher, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or the person permits another person who is under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control, or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $500 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of not less than seven months nor more than one year; (iii) For a first offense, a person also shall be subject to the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.). (2) For a second violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of not less than $500.00 nor more than $1,000.00, and shall be ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days, which shall be of such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 48 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 90 days, and shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of two years upon conviction, and, after the expiration of said period, he may make application to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission for a license to operate a motor vehicle, which application may be granted at the discretion of the chief administrator, consistent with subsection (b) of this section. For a second violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.) or shall have his registration certificate and registration plates revoked for two years under the provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1). (3) For a third or subsequent violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of $1,000.00, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and shall thereafter forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for 10 years. For a third or subsequent violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.) or shall have his registration certificate and registration plates revoked for 10 years under the provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1). As used in this section, the phrase "narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug" includes an inhalant or other substance containing a chemical capable of releasing any toxic vapors or fumes for the purpose of inducing a condition of intoxication, such as any glue, cement or any other substance containing one Commissioner of Health and Senior Services in consultation with the Governor's Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.). The centers shall conduct a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The Commissioner of Health and Senior Services shall adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.), in order to effectuate the purposes of this subsection. (g) When a violation of this section occurs while: (1) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property; (2) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or (3) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution, the convicted person shall: for a first offense, be fined not less than $500 or more than $800, be imprisoned for not more than 60 days and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than one year or more than two years; for a second offense, be fined not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000, perform community service for a period of 60 days, be imprisoned for not less than 96 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 180 days, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served performing community service in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than four years; and, for a third offense, be fined $2,000, imprisoned for 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of 20 years; the period of license suspension shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person. A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection. It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session. (h) A court also may order a person convicted pursuant to subsection a. of this section, to participate in a supervised visitation program as either a condition of probation or a form of community service, giving preference to those who were under the age of 21 at the time of the offense. Prior to ordering a person to participate in such a program, the court may consult with any person who may provide useful information on the defendant's physical, emotional and mental suitability for the visit to ensure that it will not cause any injury to the defendant. The court also may order that the defendant participate in a counseling session under the supervision of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit prior to participating in the supervised visitation program. The supervised visitation program shall be at one or more of the following facilities which have agreed to participate in the program under the supervision of the facility's personnel and the probation department: (1) a trauma center, critical care center or acute care hospital having basic emergency services, which receives victims of motor vehicle accidents for the purpose of observing appropriate victims of drunk drivers and victims who are, themselves, drunk drivers; (2) a facility which cares for advanced alcoholics or drug abusers, to observe persons in the advanced stages of alcoholism or drug abuse; or (3) if approved by a county medical examiner, the office of the county medical examiner or a public morgue to observe appropriate victims of vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers. As used in this section, "appropriate victim" means a victim whose condition is determined by the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer to be appropriate for demonstrating the results of accidents involving drunk drivers without being unnecessarily gruesome or traumatic to the defendant. If at any time before or during a visitation the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer determine that the visitation may be or is traumatic or otherwise inappropriate for that defendant, the visitation shall be terminated without prejudice to the defendant. The program may include a personal conference after the visitation, which may include the sentencing judge or the judge who coordinates the program for the court, the defendant, defendant's counsel, and, if available, the defendant's parents to discuss the visitation and its effect on the defendant's future conduct. If a personal conference is not practicable because of the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction, conflicting time schedules, or any other reason, the court shall require the defendant to submit a written report concerning the visitation experience and its impact on the defendant. The county, a court, any facility visited pursuant to the program, any agents, employees, or independent contractors of the court, county, or facility visited pursuant to the program, and any person supervising a defendant during the visitation, are not liable for any civil damages resulting from injury to the defendant, or for civil damages associated with the visitation which are caused by the defendant, except for willful or grossly negligent acts intended to, or reasonably expected to result in, that injury or damage. The Supreme Court may adopt court rules or directives to effectuate the purposes of this subsection. (i) In addition to any other fine, fee, or other charge imposed pursuant to law, the court shall assess a person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section a surcharge of $100, of which amount $50 shall be payable to the municipality in which the conviction was obtained and $50 shall be payable to the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey for deposit into the General Fund. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.14 Operation of a motor vehicle by person who has consumed alcohol but is under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages; penalties Any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01% or more, but less than 0.08%, by weight of alcohol in his blood, shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State or shall be prohibited from obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period of not less than 30 or more than 90 days beginning on the date he becomes eligible to obtain a license or on the day of conviction, whichever is later, and shall perform community service for a period of not less than 15 or more than 30 days. In addition, the person shall satisfy the program and fee requirements of an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or participate in a program of alcohol education and highway safety as prescribed by the chief administrator. The penalties provided under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to the penalties which the court may impose under N.J.S. 2C:33-15, R.S. 33:1-81, R.S. 39:4-50 or any other law. N.J.S.A. 39:4-51 Sentence for violation of section N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 must be served; release on work release program A person who has been convicted of a first or second violation of section 39:4-50 of this Title, and in pursuance thereof has been imprisoned in a county jail or workhouse in the county in which the offense was committed, shall not, after commitment, be released therefrom until the term of imprisonment imposed has been served. A person imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse may in the discretion of the court, be released on a work release program. No warden or other officer having custody of the county jail or workhouse shall release therefrom a person so committed, unless the person has been released by the court on a work release program, until the sentence has been served. A person sentenced to an inpatient rehabilitation program may upon petition by the treating agency be released, by the court, to an outpatient rehabilitation program for the duration of the original sentence. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere in any way with the operation of a writ of habeas corpus, a proceeding in lieu of the prerogative writs, or an appeal. The administrator shall adopt such rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of this section as he shall deem necessary. CONCLUSION The State must clearly prove certain conditions, among others: 1. The equipment was in proper working order was periodically inspected in accordance with procedures. Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 81 and 82 (1984) 2. The operator was qualified__i.e., properly certified__to administer the instrument. Id.; State v. Ernst, 230 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 1989), cert den. 117 N.J. 40; 3. The test was given correctly-- ie in accordance with official instructions and accepted procedures. Romano, supra at 81 and 82 The law entitles drunk driving defendants to pre_trial discovery. R.3:13_3; R.7:4_2(h); State v. Young, 242 N.J. Super. 467, 470 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Utsch, 184 N.J. Super. 575, 579 (App. Div. 1982). Due process requires the State disclose evidence that is material to either guilt or punishment; indeed, the prosecution has a constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence that would raise reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976). A wide variety of materials in the State's possession could constitute exculpatory information to which a defendant is entitled. Ford, supra at 52 A demand for discovery has been served upon the prosecutor who has the responsibility to answer. State v. Tull, 234 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (Law Div. 1989). A defendant's right to discovery is not dependent upon an appraisal of the beneficial value of the material sought to be discovered. State v. Polito, 116 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 1977), Ford, supra at 51). Thus, a prosecutor is expected to act reasonably when responding to a discovery demand. Tull, supra at 496. The prosecutor may not refuse a discovery demand simply because the information or materials sought are not in the municipal offices or within easy reach. Id. at 495. The municipal prosecutor cannot refuse production on the ground that the requested information is not known by the prosecutor personally to be in existence when its existence is either common knowledge of the police department or when the knowledge could be obtained by reasonable inquiry. Id. at 500. The municipal prosecutor must either object to what the prosecutor perceives to be irrelevant discovery requests, or respond within 10 days of the receipt of the defendant's request for discovery. Ford supra at 51; see Tull, supra at 500. The municipal prosecutor may be sanctioned for failing to provide discovery. R.3:13_; see State v. Audette, 201 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1985) State v. Polasky, 216 N.J. Super. 549 (Law Div. 1986). A defendant who believes the State has not supplied relevant materials reasonably required for the defense may give notice to the State and the court prior to the date set for commencement of trial where possible. Ford, supra at 52. Information relating to prerequisite conditions establishing reliability is highly relevant, Ford, supra at 52, and extremely material. Id. at 51. Thus, information concerning conditions under which tests were held, the machine operator's competence, the particular machine's state of repair and identification, and documentation of the ampoule used for defendant's breath tests are all relevant inquiries. Id. Conclusion If charged with Driving While Intoxicated, immediately schedule an in-office appointment with a trial attorney. Don't rely on a real estate attorney, public defender or a family member who simply attended law school. When your driving privileges and ability to drive to work is on the line, hire an experienced attorney. KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030 TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc. Dunellen, Middlesex, Piscataway, South Plainfield, Edison, Metuchen, Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Carteret, Highland Park, New Brunswick, North Brunswick, Milltown, East Brunswick, South River, Sayreville, South Amboy, Old Bridge, Spotswood, South Brunswick, Plainsboro, Cranbury, Monroe, Jamesburg,

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended


No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition. 

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days. 

911 call gave cause to stop car for dwi

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

COREEN CLARK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Decided November 21, 2014, before the Honorable Edward A. Jerejian, J.S.C. 

On appeal from Garfield Municipal Court, Docket No. 13-93 

 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

DOCKET NO.: 13-93 

BMA: 004-10-14 

___________________________________________________________ 

This matter is on appeal from the Garfield Municipal Court. On March 27, 2013, Coreen Clark was issued the following three summonses: (1) Driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; (2) DWI in a school zone contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)(1); and (3) refusal contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. (T31-3 to 11). 

On November 25, 2013, defendant appeared with counsel in the Garfield Municipal Court for trial before the Honorable Giuseppe C. Randazzo. (T). At the conclusion of trial, the Judge found the defendant guilty of DWI, DWI in a school zone, and refusal. (T111-4 to 12). 

This was the defendant’s second DWI conviction. The trial court merged the DWI with the DWI in a school zone and sentenced the defendant to: $807 in fines; $33 in 2 

court costs; $50 Victims of Crime Compensation Board (“VCCB”) assessment; $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund (“SNSF”) assessment; $200 DWI surcharge; four (4) year driver’s license suspension; 48 hours in an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (“IDRC”); two years with an ignition interlock device; and 45 days in Bergen County Jail. (T114-5 to 16). 

The following fines and penalties were imposed for the refusal: $807 in fines; $33 in court costs; $50 VCCB assessment; $75 SNSF assessment; $200 DWI surcharge; four (4) year driver’s license suspension; 48 hours in an IDRC; two years with an ignition interlock device; and 45 days in Bergen County Jail. The refusal penalties were to run concurrent to the sentence for DWI in a school zone. (T114-17 to 23). 

On December 12, 2013, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

On March 27, 2013, at approximately 8:00 PM, Garfield Police Department dispatcher Joseph Calvitti (Calvitti) received a call from an unnamed concerned citizen reporting an erratic driver traveling on Outwater Lane. (T7-6 to T8-13). The anonymous caller informed Calvitti that a dark GMC with a partial plate of “L95” nearly struck multiple parked vehicles. (T8-17 to 24). At that point, Calvitti relayed that information to Officer Anthony Koptrya (Koptrya) and Officer Matio Pozo (Pozo) of the Garfield Police Department. (T8-25 to T9-12). Calvitti remained on the line with the anonymous caller and the caller conveyed to Calvitti that the defendant was traveling at a high rate of speed, again almost struck a couple of vehicles, and eventually made a left and pulled into the parking lot of the bar Three Wise Monks (bar). (T9-13 to T10-22). 

Upon arriving at the bar, Koptrya approached a dark colored GMC with license 3 

plate “L95CCZ.” (T15-19 to T16-1). Koptrya tapped the defendants window and advised her that he had stopped her due to a report of erratic driving. (T15-25 to T16-1). The Officer asked the defendant for her credentials, and in an attempt to hand over those credentials, the defendant dropped her license, struggled to produce her insurance card, and dropped her AAA card. (T16-9 to T17-12). Koptrya testifies that the defendant had watery and bloodshot eyes, she was unable to keep eye contact, and had a strong odor of alcohol emanating from her breath. (T17-23 to T18-10). It was at this point that the Officer asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle and when doing so, the defendant braced herself for support on the vehicle’s door. (T17-22 to T18-2). 

Officer Kopytra informed the defendant that he would be administering some field sobriety tests. (T18-23 to 25). The Officer administered both the horizontal gaze nystagmus and vertical gaze nystagmus test and at trial both parties stipulated that these test are only admissible for probable cause, and not toward indicia of intoxication. (T19-1 to 7). 

Next, the Officer administered the walk and turn test. (T19-9 to 10). The area where the test was to be performed was level and free of cracks and debris. (T19-13 to 14). When asked to perform the test, the Officer testifies that defendant said she wouldn’t put her foot in front of her and she was only here to pick up money. (T19-22 to 25). Furthermore, she stated that she barely drove because she knows her limit when she drinks. (T20-2 to 5). When the defendant was asked a second time to perform the test, she again refused. (T20-11 to 16). 

Lastly, Kopytra advised the defendant that he would be administering the one leg stand test. (T20-19 to 20). The defendant told the Officer that she would “not fucking do 4 

the test at all.” (T20-22 to 23; T21-1). 

At this point, Officer Kopytra placed the defendant under arrest and brought her to police headquarters. (T21-10 to 12). While in the Officers car, the defendant repetitively addressed the Officer as, “a fucking asshole,” “a fucking newbie,” and “a fucking pig with a hard-on.” (T21-18 to 25). 

At police headquarters, the defendant continued her disrespect toward the Officer and displayed a wide range of emotions such as being angry, being calm, and crying. (T28-3 to T29-14). She then informed Officer Koptrya that she won every DWI case and would beat this DWI case also. (T29-17 to 24). 

Officer Koptrya read the DMV Standard Statement to the defendant, and she refused to give a breath sample. (T24-9 to T25-5). He then read the defendant her miranda rights to which the defendant replied, “fuck you, you’re are an asshole.” (T26-3 to T27-10). At this point, Officer Koptrya concluded that the defendant was intoxicated and arrested the defendant and issued summonses for DWI, DWI in a school zone, and refusal. (T31-3 to 22). 

At trial, he defendant testified on her own behalf and claimed to have suffered from several medical condition such as: ADHD, asthma, anxiety, and bipolar depression. (T68-20 to 23). She testified that she informed the Officer that she was unable to perform the field sobriety test because of these medical conditions. (T70-25 to T71-10). Furthermore, the defendant contends that she attempted to do the walk and turn test, but it would have been impossible due to ground conditions, her medical conditions, and her shoes. (T72-2 to 14). 

Defendant admits to ignoring and eventually denying Officer Koptrya’s request to 5 

provide a breath sample. (T77-7 to 23). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Appellate Division has specified that the standard of review to be used by the Superior Court Law Division when hearing a municipal appeal is de novo. R. 3:23-8a. The function of the court is to determine the case completely anew on the record made in the Municipal Court, giving due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the magistrate to judge the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964). A trial de novo requires the trier to make findings of fact. The Law Division’s role is not the appellate function governed by the substantial evidence rule, but rather an independent fact-finding function in respect of Defendant’s guilt or innocence. State v. States, 44 N.J. 285, 293 (1965); R. 3:23-8a. Appellate courts should defer to the credibility findings of the trial court because they are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 475 (1999). 

LEGAL ARGUMENT 

POINT I 

OFFICER KOPYTRA HAD REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO CONDUCT A MOTOR VEHICLE STOP. 

The defendant argues that Officer Kopytra lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a motor vehicle stop. 

The State argues that the defendant’s erratic driving, which was reported in a play-by-play manner by an anonymous caller, was sufficient probable cause to conduct a motor vehicle stop. 6 

A police officer is justified in conducting a motor vehicle stop when he has articulable and reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed a motor vehicle offense. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than the probable cause standard needed for an arrest. State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002). 

In State v. Amelio, the court found reasonable articulable suspicion when a defendant’s daughter called 9-1-1 and reported that the defendant was drunk and gave a vehicle description. 197 N.J. 207 (2008). In Navarette v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that the police may conduct a motor vehicle stop based on an anonymous tip pertaining to reckless driving. 134 S.Ct. 1683 (2014). 

In State v. Golotta, the Court found the police acted constitutionally when they conducted a motor vehicle stop solely on information provided to them by an anonymous caller. 178 N.J. 205, 221-222 (2003). The Court stated that the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment is met when the caller provides sufficient information, such as adequate description of the vehicle or its location, so the officer can verify the vehicle stopped is the same as the vehicle which was identified by the caller. Id. 

In this case, the anonymous caller reached Calvitti, a 9-1-1 dispatcher, through a call being placed to the Garfield Police Department. (T7-23 to T8-4). The caller informed Calvitti that the defendant was driving erratically and nearly hit multiple vehicles. (T8-7 to 22). Additionally, the caller informed Calvitti that the defendant was driving a dark GMC with partial license plate “L95” and gave up to date details of the route the defendant was taking, including the defendant pulling into the parking lot of the Three 7 

Wise Monks. (T8-17 to T10-8). Calvitti passed this information along to Officer Koptrya and Officer Pozo. (T9-2 to 12). The Officer found the defendant’s vehicle, which matched the description provided by the caller, parked where the anonymous caller said it would be. (T15-19 to 23; T48-20 to T49-8). 

For the reasons stated above, this Court agrees that Officer Koptrya had reasonable articulable suspicion to pursue a motor vehicle stop of the defendant. 

POINT II 

THE STATEMENTS MADE FROM ANONYMOUS CALLER TO CALVITTI WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED HEARSAY. 

Defendant argues that the Trial Court erred when they allowed Calvitti to testify as to his conversation with the anonymous 911 caller. 

The State argues that this testimony was properly admitted into trial under N.J.R.E. 801(c)(3). 

According to N.J.R.E. 801(c)(3), present sense impression testimony is admissible if it is, “a statement of observation, description or explanation of an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant was perceiving the event or condition and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.” 

In State v. Marsh, the court held that statements made by an anonymous informant while witnessing the event in question were inherently reliable and admissible during the trial. 162 N.J. Super. 290, 298-299 (Law. Div. 1978). The court stated that the information relayed was reliable because it was detailed and reported ongoing events. Id. 

In this case, the anonymous caller identified the make of the vehicle as well a partial license plate. (T8-19 to 22). The caller informed Calvitti, in detail, how and where the defendant was driving. (T8-6 to T10-8). Officer Koptrya found the defendants vehicle 8 

exactly where the anonymous caller said the vehicle would be. (T15-19 to 23). There is nothing in the evidence to show that the caller was not reliable. 

Therefore, the Trial Court properly allowed this evidence into trial pursuant to N.J.R.E. 801(c)(3). 

POINT III 

DEFENDANT IS GUILTY DE NOVO OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO A BREATHALYZER. 

Defendant argues that her asthma condition prevents her from being capable of providing a breath sample. 

The State argues that the defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer and has provided no evidence that her asthma prevents her from providing a breath sample. 

According to N.J.S.A 39:4-50.2, any person who operates a motor vehicle on a public road is deemed to have given consent to determine the content of alcohol in his blood. The officer must have reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving while intoxicated. Id. 

According to State v. Bernhardt, a charge for refusal is proper when “anything substantially short of an unqualified, unequivocal assent to an officer’s request that the arrested motorist take the test….” 245 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 1991). 

In this case, the defendant was driving erratically, refusing to attempt the field sobriety test, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and was displaying a wide range of emotions. After being advised of her rights and asked to take breathalyzer, the defendant first stayed silent. (T24-13 to 22). When asked again, Officer Koptrya testifies that the defendant refused to take the test. (T24-13 to T25-5). Defendant also admitted that she refused to take the test. (T77-7 to 23). At that point, the defendant did not inform the 9 

Officer that she could not take the test due to any medical conditions. Furthermore, the defendant offered no expert witnesses to testify to any of her medical conditions. 

For these reasons, this Court finds de novo that there is sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of refusal contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. 

POINT IV 

DEFENDANT IS GUILTY DE NOVO OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CONTRAY TO N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. 

The defendant argues that there was not sufficient evidence submitted at trial to prove she was driving while intoxicated. 

The State argues there was sufficient observational evidence to prove the defendant was driving while intoxicated. 

According to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, a person shall not “operate a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquors.” A defendant need not be absolutely drunk to be guilty of this but need only be “imbibed to the extent that his physical coordination or mental faculties are deleteriously affected.” State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 164-165 (1964). 

Observational evidence alone is sufficient to establish that a defendant was driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Liberatore, 293, N.J. Super. 580,589 (Law. Div. 1996). The courts will consider a wide range of factors when determining whether defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. 455, 465 (App. Div. 2002) (sustaining conviction on defendant's driving without headlights on, smell of alcohol on defendant's breath, slurred speech, combative demeanor, difficulty standing, and inability to perform the field sobriety tests); State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super 244, 251-252 (App. 10 

Div. 2001) (sustaining conviction on defendant's watery eyes, slurred speech, inability to follow commands, defendant's admission that he had consumed alcohol, staggering while walking, and failure to complete field sobriety test). 

In this case, the defendant was seen by an anonymous caller driving erratically and almost hitting multiple vehicles. (T8-7 to 22). When the Officer asked for the defendant’s credentials, the defendant had difficulty producing them. (T16-7 to T17-12). Officers smelled a strong odor coming from the defendant’s breath and she had watery and bloodshot eyes. (T17-15 to T18-10). When exiting the vehicle, the defendant had to use the door to brace herself. (T18-11 to 19). The defendant refused to cooperate with any field sobriety test and was uncooperative with officers. (T18-23 to T21-2). Lastly, the defendant displayed a wide range of emotions from being angry, to being calm, to crying. 

Therefore, this court finds de novo, that there is sufficient evidence to determine the defendant was guilty of DWI through observational evidence contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. 

POINT V 

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED RELEVANT EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 403. 

The defendant argues that the Trial Judge improperly allowed prejudicial evidence into trial. 

The State argues that the evidence admitted was relevant and was properly admitted under N.J.R.E. 403. 

According to N.J.R.E 403, “relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, 11 

or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 

The mere possibility that evidence may be prejudicial to the defendant does not justify exclusion. State v. Swing, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 253 (App. Div. 2000). When a judge is balancing under N.J.R.E. 403, the trial judge’s “discretion is a broad one.” State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978). Determinations by the trial court will not be overruled on appeal absent a “finding so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.” State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982). 

Defendant argues that the testimony of the defendant’s inappropriate behavior and excessive cursing was unduly prejudicial. However, the testimony was probative and relevant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was intoxicated. Defendant argued that she was not intoxicated and her behavior was circumstantial evidence to the contrary. 

Additionally, the trial Judge stated that hearing the testimony would not affect his opinion, that the prosecutor would not sway his opinion, and that there was no jury present to sway. 

Therefore, this Court agrees that the testimony relating to the defendant’s erratic behavior is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. 

POINT VI 

THE DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DWI ALLOWS THE COURT TO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT AS A SECOND OFFENDER ON BOTH THE DWI AND THE REFUSAL 

The defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to four (4) years license suspension for DWI in a school zone and four (4) years license suspension on the refusal to run concurrent. 12 

The State argues that although two four (4) year suspensions running concurrently was an improper sentence, the defendant should be sentenced to two two (2) year license suspensions to run consecutively. In State v. Reiner, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the heightened DWI in a school zone penalties only apply if the defendant’s prior conviction of DWI was also in a school zone. 180 N.J. 307, 318 (2004). 

In this case, defendant’s previous conviction was for DWI contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. That being the case, defendant’s conviction for DWI in a school zone merges into defendant’s DWI. Thus, defendant should be sentenced as a second offender contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. 

In State v. Frye, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that previous DWI convictions enhance the penalties on subsequent refusal convictions. 217 N.J. 566, 581-582 (2014). In that case, defendant, who had two previous DWI convictions, pled guilty to refusal. Id. at 568. Defendant was sentenced as a third time offender contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Id. 

According to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, for a second offense, “the revocation shall be consecutive to any revocation imposed for a conviction under the provisions of R.S.39:4-50.” 

As stated above, defendant has a previous DWI conviction. Therefore, defendants sentence for refusal shall be sentenced as a second offense and run consecutive to defendant’s conviction for DWI. 13 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the record below, and after oral argument and a de novo hearing, this Court finds the defendant guilty of: (1) Driving while intoxicated contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; (2) Driving while intoxicated in a school zone contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)(1); and (3) refusal contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. 

As such, this Court imposes the following penalties: 

(1) For violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, the defendant is sentenced to; 

Fine: $506 

DWI Surcharge: $100 

DDEF: $100 

Court Costs: $33 

SNSF: $75 

VCCB: $50 

IDRC: 48 hours 

Loss of D.L.: 2 years 

Ignition Interlock: 2 years 

Jail: 40 Days 

(2) For violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)(1), defendants sentence will merge with count 1; 

Fine: $506 

DWI Surcharge: $100 

DDEF Surcharge: $100 

Court Costs: $33 

SNSF: $75 

VCCB: $50 

IDRC: 12 hours 

Loss of D.L.: 1 year 

(3) For violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, defendant is sentenced to; 

Fine: $506 

DWI Surcharge: $100 

DDEF Surcharge: $100 

Court Costs: $33 

SNSF: $75 

VCCB: $50 

IDRC: 48 hours 14 

Loss of D.L.: 2 years 

Ignition Interlock: 2 years 

As per N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, defendant’s sentence for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 will run consecutive to her sentence for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Additionally, defendant has already served 40 days in the Bergen County Jail. 

______________________________ 

Date: November 21, 2014 Honorable Edward A. Jerejian, J.S.C. 

39:4-126. Signaling before starting, turning or stopping

39:4-126.  Signaling before starting, turning or stoppingNo person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section 39:4-123, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway, or start or back a vehicle unless and until such movement can be made with safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter  provided in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.

A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

 No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear.

The signal herein required shall be given either by means of the hand and arm in the manner herein specified, or by an approved mechanical or electrical signal device, except that when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent the hand and arm signal from being visible, both to front and rear, the  signal shall be given by a device of a type which has been approved by the  division.

When the signal is given by means of the hand and arm, the driver shall indicate his intention to stop or turn by extending the hand and arm from and beyond the left side of the vehicle in the following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows:

    (a) Left turn.--Hand and arm extended horizontally.

     (b) Right turn.--Hand and arm extended upward.

     (c) Stop or decrease speed.--Hand and arm extended downward.

     Amended by L.1951, c. 23, p. 92, s. 67;  L.1956, c. 107, p. 485, s. 2.

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40  Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40.  No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

(2) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.

(3) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;

g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2009, c.224);

h. A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person: 

(1) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or

(2) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the person's license was suspended or revoked.

In any case where a person who owns or leases a motor vehicle knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege of the person he permits to operate the motor vehicle is suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the person also shall be subject to the following penalties: for a first or second offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both; and for a third or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, and forfeiture of the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days;

i. If the violator's driver's license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10) or for failure to comply with a time payment order, the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has paid all fines and other assessments related to the parking violation that were the subject of the Order of Suspension, or if the violator makes sufficient payments to become current with respect to payment obligations under the time payment order;

j. If a person is convicted for a second or subsequent violation of this section and the second or subsequent offense involves a motor vehicle moving violation, the term of imprisonment for the second or subsequent offense shall be 10 days longer than the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.

For the purposes of this subsection, a "motor vehicle moving violation" means any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State for which motor vehicle points are assessed by the chief administrator pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1; 2002, c.28; 2007, c.187; 2009, c.224, s.1; 2009, c.332.