NJAC 13:-19-10.1 Point Assessment

Compiled by the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen N.J.A.C. 13:-19-10.1 Point Assessment Any person who is convicted of any of the following offenses, including offenses committed while operating a motorized bicycle, shall be assessed points for each conviction in accordance with the following schedule: N.J.S.A. Statutory Violation Description Points VIOLATION POINTS 27:23-29 Moving against traffic-NJ Tpke., Garden State Pkwy. and Atlantic City Expressway 2 27:23-29 Improper passing-NJ Tpke., Garden State Pkwy. and Atlantic City Expressway 4 27:23-29 Unlawful use of median strip-NJ Tpke., Garden State Pkwy. and Atlantic City Expressway 2 39:3-20 Operating constructor vehicle in excess of 45 mph 3 39:4-14.3 Operating motorized bicycle on restricted highway 2 39:4-14.3d More than 1 person on a motorized bicycle. 2 39:4-35 Failure to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk, 2 39:4-36 Failure to yield to pedestrian or passing a vehicle yielding to pedestrian in crosswalk 2 39:4-41 Driving through safety zone. 2 39:4-52 Racing on Highway 5 39:4-55 Improper action or omission on grades and curves 2 39:4-57 Failure to observe directions of officer. 2 39:4-66 Failure to stop before crossing sidewalk 2 39:4-66.1 Failure to yield to pedestrians or vehicles while entering or leaving highway 2 39:4-66.2 Driving on private property to avoid traffic signal or stop sign 2 39:4-71 Improper driving on sidewalk 2 39:4-80 Failure to obey direction of officer 2 39:4-81 Failure to observe traffic signal 2 39:4-82 Failure to keep right 2 39:4-82.1 Improper operating of vehicle on divided highway or divider 2 39:4-83 Failure to keep right at intersection 2 39:4-84 Failure to pass right of vehicle proceeding in opposite direction 5 39:4-85 Improper passing on right or off roadway 4 39:4-85.1 Wrong way on one-way street 2 39:4-86 Improper passing, in No Passing zone 4 39:4-87 Failure to yield to overtake vehicle 2 39:4-88 Failure to observe traffic lanes 2 39:4-89 Tailgating 5 39:4-90 Failure to yield at intersection 2 39:4-90.1 Failure to use proper entrances to limited access highway 2 39:4-91, Failure to yield to emergency vehicle 2 39:4-96 Reckless driving 5 39:4-97 Careless driving 2 39:4-97a Destruction of agricultural or recreational property 2 39:4-97.1 Slow speed blocking traffic 2 39:4-98 or Speeding up to 14mph above limit 2 39:4-99 Speeding 15-29 mph above limit 4 Speeding 30 mph or more above limit 5 39:4-105 Failure to stop at traffic light 2 39:4-115 Improper turn at traffic light 3 39:4-119 Failure to stop at flashing red signal 2 39:4-122 Failure to stop for police whistle 2 39:4-123 Improper right or left turn 3 39:4-124 Improper turn: from approved turning course 3 39:4-125 Improper u-turn 3 39:4-126 Failure to give proper signal 2 39:4-127 Improper backing or turn in street 2 39:4-127.1 Improper crossing of railroad grade crossing 2 39:4-127.2 Improper crossing of bridge 2 39:4-128 Improper crossing of railroad grade crossing by certain vehicles 2 39:4-128.1 Improper passing of school bus 5 39:4-128.4 Improper passing of frozen dessert truck 4 39:4-129 Leaving scene of accident- No injuries 2 39:4-129 Personal Injury 8 39:4-144 Failure to observe of stop or yield signs 2 39:5D-4 Moving violation out-of-state 2 N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2 Point Accumulation; period of suspension (a) The Director shall, except for good cause, suspend a persons license to operate a motor vehicle and/or motorized bicycle in accordance with the following schedule: POINTS ACCUMULATED PERIOD OF SUSPENSION 12 to 15 points in a period of two years or less; 30 days 16 to 18 points in a period of two years or less; 60 days 19 to 21 points in a period of two years or less; 90 days 22 to 24 points in a period of two years or less; 120 days 25 to 27 points in a period of two years or less; 150 days 28 or more points in a period of two years or less; not less than180 days 15 to 18 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days 19 to 22 points in a period greater than two years; 60 days 23 to 26 points in a period greater than two years; 90 days 27 to 30 points in a period greater than two years; 120 days 31 to 35 points in a period greater than two years; 150 days 36 or more points in a period greater than two years; not less than 180 days 12 to 14 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days (b) For good cause shown, the Director may in his discretion permit a person to attend a driver improvement course of the Division of Motor Vehicles in total or partial satisfaction of a period of suspension imposed under (a) above. In exercising his discretion, the Director shall consider the persons driving record prior warnings or driver improvement school attendance maturity and any other aggravating or mitigating factor. Protect your Rights. Before you pled guilty and face potentially thousands of dollars in fees and surcharges, speak with an attorney who is experienced in handling these matters.

39:3-40, 39:4-50 Drivers License Increased Penalties for Driving in School Zone While Intoxicated or Suspended NJ

39:3-40, 39:4-50 Drivers License Increased Penalties for Driving in School Zone While Intoxicated or Suspended

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. N.J.S. 39:3-40 (f) Increases penalties for persons driving while suspended under certain circumstances: (a) on or within 1000 feet of school property (May use 2C:39-7 drugs); or (b) driving through a school crossing as designated by the municipality by ordinance or resolution; or (c) driving through an undesignated school crossing knowing that children are present. It shall be no defense to a prosecution under (a) or (b) that the defendant was unaware of the existence of the school zone/crossing or that no juveniles were present at the time or that school was not in session. The new penalties are as follows: License suspension 1-2 years commencing, upon completion of any prison sentence, $500 fine and; 1st offense: imprisonment 60-90 days 2nd offense: imprisonment 120-150 days 3rd and subsequent offense: imprisonment 180 days D.W.I. N.J.S. 39:4-50 (g) Increases penalties for persons driving while intoxicated when the violation occurs: (a) on or within 1000 feet of school property (May use 2C:39-7 drug maps); or (b) driving through a school crossing as designated by the municipality by ordinance or resolution; or (c) driving through and undesignated school crossing knowing t that children are present. It shall be no defense to a prosecution under (a) or (b) that the defendant was unaware of the existence of the school zone/crossing or that no juveniles were present at the time or that school was not in session. The new penalties are as follows: 1st offense: fine $500-$800 imprisonment maximum 60 days drivers license suspension 1-2 years 2nd offense: fine $1000-$2000 imprisonment 96 hours mandatory up to 180 days (which may be reduced by up to 90 days by community service). community service 60 days drivers license suspension minimum 2 years 3rd offense: fine $2000 imprisonment 180 days drivers license suspension 20 years (to commence upon completion of prison term). Driving while intoxicated while on school property 39:4-50(g) 1st Offense - $500 to $800 fine, and - imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, and - driver's license suspension for not less than 1 year nor more than 2 years, and - VCCA $50, DDEF $100, SNSF $75, and $100 surcharge, and - shall order installation of an ignition interlock device for not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year, and - satisfy the screening, evaluation, and referral requirements of the IDRC. If these requirements are not met, then mandatory 2-day term of imprisonment and driver's license suspension until requirements are satisfied. Plus $3,000 mvc surcharges and 9 car insurance points 2nd Offense - $1000 to $2000 fine, and - imprisonment of not less than 96 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 180 days, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served performing community service, and - driver's license suspension for 4 years, and - community service for 60 days, and - VCCA $50, DDEF $100, SNSF $75, and $100 surcharge, and - shall order installation of ignition interlock device for not less than 1 year nor more than 3 years, and - satisfy the screening, evaluation, and referral requirements of the IDRC. If these requirements are not met, then mandatory 2-day term of imprisonment and driver's license suspension until requirements are satisfied. Plus $3,000 mvc surcharges and 9 car insurance points 3rd or Subsequent - $2000 fine, and - imprisonment not less than 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may order the defendant to serve up to 90 days of that sentence participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the IDRC, and - driver's license suspension for 20 years to start upon completion of any prison sentence, and - VCCA $50, DDEF $100, SNSF $75, and $100 surcharge, and - shall order installation of ignition interlock device for not less than 1 year nor more than 3 years, and - satisfy the screening, evaluation, and referral requirements of the IDRC. If these requirements are not met, then mandatory 2-day term of imprisonment and driver's license suspension until requirements are satisfied. Plus $3,000 mvc surcharges and 9 car insurance points REFUSAL N.J.S. 39:4-50.4a Increases penalties when the offense occurs: (a) on or within 1000 feet of school property (May use 2C:39-7 drug maps); or (b) driving through a school crossing as designated by the municipality by ordinance or resolution; or (c) driving through an undesignated school crossing knowing that children are present. It shall be no defense to a prosecution under (a) or (b) that the defendant was unaware of the existence of the school zone/crossing or that no juveniles were present at the time or that school was not in session. The new penalties are as follows: Fine $500-$1000 and; 1st offense drivers license suspension - 1 year; 2nd offense drivers license suspension - 4 years; 3rd offense drivers license suspension - 20 years. 39:4-50.4a Refusal to submit to chemical test on school property (penalty provision at N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a(b) 1st Offense - $600 to $1000 fine, and - driver's license suspension not less than 1 year or more than 2 years (consecutive to any revocation imposed under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), and - DDEF $100, and - shall refer offender to IDRC. 2nd Offense - $1000 to $2000 fine, and - driver's license suspension for 4 years (consecutive to any revocation imposed under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), and - DDEF $100, and - shall refer offender to IDRC. 3rd or Subsequent - $2000 fine, and - driver's license suspension for 20 years (consecutive to any revocation imposed under N.J.S.A. 39:4- 50), and - DDEF $100, and - shall refer offender to IDRC. Plus $3,000 mvc surcharges and 9 car insurance points

39:4-128.1 Passing a School Bus - Penalties NJ

39:4-128.1 Passing a School Bus - Penalties

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. 39:4-128.1. School buses stopped for children; duty of motorists; duty of bus driver; violations; revocation of license 1. On highways having roadways not divided by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle approaching or overtaking a bus, which is being used solely for the transportation of children to or from school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity and which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, shall stop such vehicle not less than 25 feet from such school bus and keep such vehicle stationary until such child has entered said bus or has alighted and reached the side of such highway and until a flashing red light is no longer exhibited by the bus; provided, such bus is designated as a school bus by one sign on the front and one sign on the rear, with each letter on such signs at least four inches in height. On highways having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of avehicle overtaking a school bus, which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, shall stop such vehicle not less than 25 feet from such school bus and keep such vehicle stationary until such child has entered said bus or has alighted and reached the side of the highway and until a flashing red light is no longer exhibited by the bus. On highways having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle on another roadway approaching a school bus, which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, shall reduce the speed of his vehicle to not more than 10 miles per hour and shall not resume normal speed until the vehicle has passed the bus and has passed any child who may have alighted there from or be about to enter said bus. For purposes of this section, "highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way whether publicly or privately maintained when any part thereof is open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Whenever a school bus is parked at the curb for the purpose of receiving children directly from a school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity or discharging children to enter a school, or a summer day camp or any school connected activity, which is located on the same side of the street as that on which the bus is parked, drivers of vehicles shall be permitted to pass said bus without stopping, but at a speed not in excess of 10 miles per hour. The driver of a bus which is being used solely for the transportation of children to or from school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity shall continue to exhibit a flashing red light and shall not start his bus until every child who may have alighted there from shall have reached a place of safety. PENALTIES: 5 POINTS BY DMV, PLUS 5 CAR INSURANCE ELIGIBILITY POINTS, PLUS: Any person who shall violate any provision of this act shall be subject to (1) a fine of not less than $100.00, (2) imprisonment for not more than 15 days or community service for 15 days in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate, (3) or both for the first offense, and a fine not less than $250.00, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both for each subsequent offense. The penalties shall be enforced and recovered pursuant to the provisions of chapter 5 of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle which was involved in the violation of this section was the person who committed the act. The Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles may also revoke the license to drive a motor vehicle of any person who shall have been guilty of such willful violation of any of the provisions of this act as shall, in the discretion of the director, justify such revocation, but the director shall, at all times, have power to validate such a license which has been revoked, or to grant a new license to any person whose license to drive a motor vehicle shall have been revoked pursuant to this act. Hire an experienced attorney to defend your if charged with this violation.

39:4-98, 39:4-99 Speeding and Radar NJ

39:4-98, 39:4-99 Speeding and Radar

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents persons charged with speeding more than 15 miles over the speed limit an other serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Fine $50 $200 plus court costs, jail not exceeding 15 days, or both when guilty. Fine doubled when driving 20 mph over.  Exceeding maximum speed 1-14 mph over limit             2points   Exceeding maximum speed 15-29 mph over limit    4  points  Exceeding maximum speed 30 mph or more over limit           5 points It is well established that the prosecution of a defendant for a motor vehicle violation is a quasi-criminal proceeding. In such a proceeding the burden of proof is upon the state to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In every charge of a speeding violation, the complaint or summons must specify (l) the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven, (2) the speed which is prima facie unlawful, and (3) the time and place of the alleged violation. A sign showing a speed limit is merely notice of the law or an ordinance or regulation prohibiting a greater speed. The sign itself does not set the speed limit. There can be no conviction for violation of the edict of a posted sign, but only for violation of the statute, ordinance, or regulation having the force of law. There are many unauthorized signs in the state which may serve as a warning but have no effect in creating an offense. Radar Speed-measuring radar in various forms has been accepted since State v. Dantonio, l8 N.J. 570 (l955), where the N.J. Supreme Court held it is not essential that the court determine the precise speed at which the vehicle was being operated when the alleged offense occurred, and that the operator of the vehicle must be adjudged guilty if the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the drive exceeded the statutory speed limit. It is not necessary for the trial court to make a particular finding as to the precise speed in excess of the speed limit at which the defendant was traveling at the time of the violation. State v. Bookbinder, 82 N.J. Super. l79, l83 (App. Div. l964). However, if the defendant is found guilty, the trial court should determine the quantum of excess was so many miles per hour in exercising its discretion as to the penalty to be imposed within the statutory limitation. The precise speed a motorist was traveling thus is material only on the question as to the penalty to be imposed, not on the question of guilt or innocence. State v. Readding, l69 N.J. Super. 238 (Law Div. l978), restated the general rule that in order for the radar speedometer reading to be admissible into evidence, it should be established that: (l) the device is scientifically reliable; (2) the particular speedometer used in the case being tried is accurate; (3) the operator is qualified; and (4) the device was operated properly in the case being tried. How Radar Operates In State v. Wojtkowiak, l70 N.J. Super. 44 (Law Div. l979), revd on other grounds, l74 N.J. Super. 460, Judge Wells examined in detail the K-55 Radar, and his conclusions were incorporated by the Appellate Division. This case should be read and reread for a detailed explanation of Radar by a Court. The traffic radar method speed detection measurement depends upon the Doppler effect. Simply stated a radio wave which strikes a moving object is reflected from that object at different frequency from that of the incident wave. A radar which transmits waves and receives reflected waves can determine their frequency difference and calculate the speed of the object which produced the reflective wave. Courts have accepted as scientifically reliable MPH Industries K-55 Traffic Radar -- the primary system employed for the purpose of measuring the speed of motor vehicles in New Jersey. In State v. Wojtkowiak, l74 N.J. Super, 460 (App. Div. l980), the appeals court held in all future cases the state should adduce evidence at the municipal court level as to (l) the specific training and extent of experience of the officer operating the radar, (2) the calibration of the machine was checked by at least two external tuning forks both singly and in combination, and (3) the calibration of the speedometer of the patrol car in cases where the K-55 is operating in the moving mode. MPH Industries, manufacturer and distributor of the K-55, sets forth the following eight points an officer must be able to testify to: * The officer must establish the time, place and location of the radar device at the time he made the reading. * The officer must be able to identify the vehicle. * The officer must identify the defendant as the operator of the vehicle * The officer must testify that he made a visual observation of the vehicle and that it was going at an excessive rate of speed. * At the time of the radar reading the officer must testify that the vehicle was out front, by itself, nearest to the radar. * The officer must state his qualifications and training in radar use. * The officer must establish that the radar was tested for accuracy both prior and after its use. * If used in the moving mode, that at the time of the radar reading the patrol speed indicated on the unit compared to the speedometer of the police vehicle. Qualified Operator? While it appeared to the court in State v. Wojtkowiak, Supra that the K-55 Radar is an accurate and reliable tool for the measurement of speed, its accuracy and reliability in any case are no better than the skill of the person operating the radar. Id. at l74. The court made this emphasis as a warning to all police departments that proper courses of instruction be developed before the K-55 Radar device is employed in any municipality. A calibration check is accomplished with the use of two tuning forks and their accuracy must be the subject of the documentary proof. Use of the K-55 does not eliminate the need for such proof. State v. Wojtkowiak, l70 N.J. Super. at 50, n.l In State v. Overton, l35 N.J. Super 443 (Cty. Ct. l975), four external tuning forks were used to test the radar unit l2 times within a period of approximately 90 minutes. The court noted there is authority to the effect that a radar unit should be checked for accuracy each time it is set up at a different location. MPH Industries argues this is not necessary with moving radar. In State v. Readding, l60 N.J. Super. 238 (Law Div. l978), the court reiterated the decision in State v. Overton, l35 N.J. Super. 443 (Cty. Ct. l975), where the court found there are three universally accepted methods of testing the accurate operation of a radar speed measuring device: 1. By use of the internal tuning fork built into the machine itself (which the court found to be improper). 2. By running the patrol car with a calibrated speedometer through the zone of influence of the radar machine. 3. By use of external tuning forks calibrated at set speeds and which emit sound waves or frequencies identical to those which would come from a vehicle traveling through the Radar bearer at the same speed for which the tuning fork has been cut. It is also important to recognize that in State v. Readding, l60 N.J. Super. 238, the court stated: the proper operation of the device must be proved, usually by detailed reference by the qualified operator to the procedures called for by the manufacturer of the device. Tuning Forks Before a radar speed reading is admissible, the state must establish the machine was operating properly. MPH Industries test procedure uses two tuning forks: First, the lower-speed fork is struck on wood or plastic and the ringing fork is held in a fixed position two to three inches in front of the antenna with the harrow edge of the fork facing the antenna front. This will cause the Patrol Monitor Window to display the forks speed. While continuing to hold this ringing fork in place, the higher-speed fork is struck and held next to the lower-speed fork (both forks must be vibrating while being held an equal distance from the antenna. The target should then display the speed difference between the two forks. For example, if the forks used are 35 mph and 65 mph, then the target window will display the difference, which is 30 mph. Admissibility of Evidence The state must establish through documentary evidence the tuning fork itself was accurate. The state must produce and be able to admit into evidence certificates as proof of the accuracy of the devices used for testing the proper operation of the machine. In State v. Cardone, l46 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. l976), the court held that while certificates do not have to satisfy the normal rules of evidence, an Evidence Rule 8 hearing still must be held, at which the court can determine preliminary issues of admissibility of evidence. In such a hearing, the rules of evidence -- except for Rule 4 or a valid claim of privilege -- do not apply. Id. at 28. The Cardone court found that the certificates of calibration and accuracy of the radar machine -- and for the tuning forks used to test the machine -- were properly admitted in evidence, even though no proof was offered to qualifying the certificates as records made in the regular course of business. The certificates were used solely as evidence of proper operating conditions or as a prerequisite to the admissibility of the radar reading, and the defendant made no effort to prove the internal calibrating device or the tuning forks were inaccurate. Previously, in State v. Overton, l35 N.J. Super. 443 (Cty. Ct. l975), it was held the municipal court judge improperly admitted certificates issued by the manufacturer of the tuning forks and the radar unit itself. The court also held the certificates were not properly authenticated, as required by Evidence Rule 67, nor was there sufficient testimony to support their admissibility as either business records under Evidence Rule 63(l3) or as reports of finding of a public official under Evidence Rule 63(l5). In State v. Readding, supra, the Superior Court exonerated the defendant, stating: It is entirely possible for a particular RADAR device to function properly and record accurately a 50 m.p.h. but inaccurately at higher speeds...... Accuracy of the particular speedometer should be established by more than one test. The Pace or Clock Method A pace or clock is performed by an officer in a patrol car with a calibrated speedometer for a duration of distance or time wherein the officer accelerated to a speed equivalent to the suspects, and then keeps a steady distance behind the suspects vehicle following that vehicle. It is essential that the patrol cars speedometer be calibrated and that the certificates of calibration both before and after, be admitted into evidence. An officer may also sometimes admit he was unable to get a good clock but may say that his vehicle was going 70 mph, for example, and he was still losing ground to the offender. The obvious shortcoming to clocking as vehicle is that the officers objective judgment may be brought into question, the interference by other traffic, or other non-reasonable factors. It is for these reasons that the clock method is used less frequently than radar. Conclusion It is no defense to argue unlawful arrest, selective enforcement, custom and usage, non-ownership of car driven, ignorance or mistake of law, lack of precise speed proved, defective speedometer or cruise control. Obey the law, follow speed limits and you will have no need to know about Radar. About the Author Kenneth A. Vercammen is a trial attorney in Metuchen, Middlesex County, New Jersey. He has lectured on traffic and criminal law for the New Jersey State Bar Association, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education and Middlesex County College. He often lectures for the New Jersey State Bar Association on personal injury, criminal / municipal court law and drunk driving. He has published 55 articles in national and New Jersey publications on municipal court and litigation topics. He has served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in seven different cities and towns in New Jersey and also successfully defended hundreds of individuals facing Municipal Court and Criminal Court charges. In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He has appeared in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Municipal Court trials, matrimonial hearings and contested administrative law hearings. Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court),with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Dept as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA. Speeding penalties as of 2003 39:4-98. Rates of speed 39:4-98. Rates of speed. Subject to the provisions of R.S.39:4-96 and R.S.39:4-97 and except in those instances where a lower speed is specified in this chapter, it shall be prima facie lawful for the driver of a vehicle to drive it at a speed not exceeding the following: a.Twenty-five miles per hour, when passing through a school zone during recess, when the presence of children is clearly visible from the roadway, or while children are going to or leaving school, during opening or closing hours; b. (1) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or residential district; (2) Thirty-five miles per hour in any suburban business or residential district; c.Fifty miles per hour in all other locations, except as otherwise provided in the Sixty-Five MPH Speed Limit Implementation Act, pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1997, c.415 (C.39:4-98.3 et al.). Whenever it shall be determined upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that any speed hereinbefore set forth is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of a highway, the Commissioner of Transportation, with reference to State highways, may by regulation and municipal or county authorities, with reference to highways under their jurisdiction, may by ordinance, in the case of municipal authorities, or by ordinance or resolution, in the case of county authorities, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Transportation, except as otherwise provided in R.S.39:4-8, designate a reasonable and safe speed limit thereat which, subject to the provisions of R.S.39:4-96 and R.S.39:4-97, shall be prima facie lawful at all times or at such times as may be determined, when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection, or other place or part of the highway. Appropriate signs giving notice of the speed limits authorized under the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection b. and subsection c. of this section may be erected if the commissioner or the municipal or county authorities, as the case may be, so determine they are necessary. Appropriate signs giving notice of the speed limits authorized under the provisions of subsection a. and paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section shall be erected by the commissioner or the municipal or county authorities, as appropriate. The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. The Commissioner of Transportation shall cause the erection and maintenance of signs at such points of entrance to the State as are deemed advisable, setting forth the lawful rates of speed, the wording of which shall be within his discretion. Amended 1939, c.211; 1942, c.325,(1942, c.325 repealed 1946, c.8); 1951, c.23, s.55; 1983, c.227, s.2; 1993, c.315, s.2; 1997, c.415, s.1. 39:4-98.1. Designation of lower maximum speed limits for trucks of registered gross weight of 10,000 pounds and over In accordance with the provisions of section 39:4-98 of the Revised Statutes, the State Highway Commissioner may, by regulation and identification by appropriate signs, designate lower maximum speed limits for trucks of a registered gross weight of 10,000 pounds and over, at a differential of 5 miles per hour, on State highways, or appropriate portions thereof, having 4 or more traffic lanes, where the legal speed limit is 50 miles per hour or greater. L.1960, c. 100, p. 588, s. 1. 39:4-98.2. Counties or municipalities; reduction of regular speed limit for 72 hours for maintenance or repairs; notice to commissioner Any county or municipal governing body may adopt an ordinance or resolution, as appropriate, designating a county or municipal official who may order a reduction of a regular speed limit for periods not to exceed 72 hours on segments of highways under its jurisdiction for the purpose of maintenance or repairs. Any resolution or ordinance adopted pursuant to this act shall specify the circumstance under which a speed limit may be reduced. An order reducing the speed limit pursuant to this act shall not require the approval of the Commissioner of Transportation; provided, however, that it shall be the duty of the designated county or municipal official to notify the commissioner of the affected segment of highway no less than 7 days before any reduced speed limit takes effect; except that in cases of emergency situations the notification period may be waived by the commissioner. It shall be the duty of the designated county or municipal official to place one or more signs indicating the reduced speed limit along the affected highway. Any speed limit established pursuant to this act shall be prima facie lawful and subject to the provisions of R.S. 39:4-96 and 39:4-97 when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected. L.1981, c. 237, s. 1, eff. July 27, 1981. 39:4-98.3. Short title 2.This act may be known and shall be cited as the Sixty-Five MPH Speed Limit Implementation Act. L.1997,c.415, s.2. 39:4-98.4. Definitions relative to 65mph speed limit 3.As used in this act: Authorities means the New Jersey Highway Authority, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority and the South Jersey Transportation Authority. Commissioner means the Commissioner of Transportation. Eligible public highways means public highways as defined in section 3 of P.L. 1984, c. 73 (C.27:1B-3) of which portions have been determined by the commissioner to be appropriate for a 65 miles per hour speed limit based on such criteria as determined by the commissioner. Public highways under the jurisdiction of counties and municipalities shall not be eligible public highways. L.1997,c.415, s.3. 39:4-98.5. Speed limit of 65mph established, certain highways 4. a. Within four months following the effective date of this act, the commissioner, in consultation with the Attorney General and the authorities, shall establish by written order speed limits of 65 miles per hour on approximately 400 miles of eligible public highways. The commissioner, pursuant to section 7 of this act, may increase or decrease the number of miles of eligible public highways on which a 65 miles per hour speed limit has been established. b.An order to be issued pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall cite the eligible public highways to which it is to be applicable and contain a description in plain language of the orders contents, the effective date of the order and any other information the commissioner deems necessary. c.The commissioner shall cause a general public notice of the proposed order, including a summary of the provisions of the proposed order, to be published in a newspaper or newspapers having general circulation in the municipality or municipalities affected by the order. The notice shall include a telephone number or address which a member of the public may use to receive a copy of the complete text of the proposed order and shall provide for a 30-day period from the date of publication for public comment. The order shall be final on the 31st day after publication of the notice or on a later date if the commissioner so determines. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as prohibiting the commissioner from extending the comment period or from modifying or withdrawing the proposed order as a result of the review of public comment. d.A final order shall be effective and enforceable upon compliance with the requirement for the posting of signs providing notice of the speed limit, as provided under the applicable provisions of R.S.39:4-98 and R.S.39:4-198. e.Any official traffic control device established pursuant to this section shall conform to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. f.Any order issued pursuant to this section shall be binding and enforceable under the provisions of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes and all other applicable laws, in any court of competent jurisdiction, until superseded by order of the commissioner pursuant to this act. L.1997,c.415, s.4. 39:4-98.6. Certain fines doubled where speed limit is 65mph 5. a. The fine for a motor vehicle offense embodied in the following sections of statutory law, when committed in an area which has been designated as having a speed limit of 65 miles per hour, shall be double the amount specified by law:

Traffic Ticket Representation NJ

Traffic Ticket Representation

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. TRAFFIC REPRESENTATION AND NO POINTS TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 4 POINTS OR LESS N.J.S.A. 39:4-1-   WE GO TO COURT TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE FOR   NEW NO POINT TICKET  Our office helps people with traffic/ municipal court tickets.  We provide representation on  most Central New Jersey traffic cases.  Motor vehicle violations and criminal charges can cost you.  If you plead guilty by mail or in court for almost all traffic tickets, you will have to pay fines in court and will later receive points on your drivers license.  Both the DMV and your car insurance company will impose surcharges and eligibility points for three years.          Under the New Jersey Court Rules, a New Jersey  Attorney can negotiate with the Municipal Court Prosecutor to attempt to reduce points.  An accumulation of too many points, or certain moving violations may require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. Division of Motor Vehicles or have your license suspended.  Don't give up!   We can appear in court for you on most Central New Jersey   traffic violations. Violation Points 27:23-29 Moving against traffic-NJ Tpke., Garden State Pkwy. and Atlantic City Expressway 2 27:23-29 Improper passing-NJ Tpke., Garden State Pkwy. and Atlantic City Expressway 4 27:23-29 Unlawful use of median strip-NJ Tpke., Garden State Pkwy. and Atlantic City Expressway 2 39:3-20 Operating constructor vehicle in excess of 45 mph 3 39:4-14.3 Operating motorized bicycle on restricted highway 2 39:4-14.3d More than 1 person on a motorized bicycle. 2 39:4-35 Failure to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk, 2 39:4-36 Failure to yield to pedestrian or passing a vehicle yielding to pedestrian in crosswalk 2 39:4-41 Driving through safety zone. 2 39:4-52 Racing on Highway 5 39:4-55 Improper action or omission on grades and curves 2 39:4-57 Failure to observe directions of officer. 2 39:4-66 Failure to stop before crossing sidewalk 2 39:4-66.1 Failure to yield to pedestrians or vehicles while entering or leaving highway 2 39:4-66.2 Driving on private property to avoid traffic signal or stop sign 2 39:4-71       Improper driving on sidewalk 2 39:4-81       Failure to observe traffic signal 2 39:4-82      Failure to keep right 2 39:4-83       Failure to keep right at intersection 2 39:4-84      Failure to pass right of vehicle proceeding in opposite direction 5 39:4-85       Improper passing on right or off roadway  or shoulder 4 39:4-85.1   Wrong way on one-way street 2 39:4-86      Improper passing, in No Passing zone 4 39:4-87      Failure to yield to overtake vehicle 2 39:4-88      Failure to observe traffic lanes 2 39:4-89       Tailgating 5 39:4-90 Failure to yield at intersection 2 39:4-90.1 Failure to use proper entrances to limited access highway 2 39:4-91, Failure to yield to emergency vehicle 2 39:4-96       Reckless driving 5 39:4-97       Careless driving 2 39:4-98 or   Speeding up to 14 mph above limit 2 39:4-99       Speeding 15-29 mph above limit  4 39:4-99       Speeding 30 mph or more above limit 5 39:4-105    Failure to stop at traffic light 2 39:4-115    Improper turn at traffic light 3 39:4-123    Improper right or left turn 3 39:4-124    Improper turn: from approved turning course 3 39:4-125    Improper u-turn 3 39:4-126    Failure to give proper signal 2 39:4-127     Improper backing or turn in street 2 39:4-128.1 Improper passing of school bus 5 39:4-128.4 Improper passing of frozen dessert truck 4 39:4-129    Leaving scene of accident - No injuries 2 39:4-144    Failure to observe stop or yield signs 2 39:5D-4 Moving violation out-of-state 2   Please call us immediately if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter. We also provide representation in DWI, Criminal and other serious court matters.  Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Former Prosecutor for the Cranbury Municipal Court from 1991-1999, and Author Municipal Court Winning Strategies. The new no point statute reads as follows:39:4-97.2  Driving, operating a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner, offense created; fines; surcharge. 1.  a. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property. b.A person convicted of a first offense under subsection a. shall be subject to a fine of not less than $50.00 or more than $150.00 and shall not be assessed any motor vehicle penalty points pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5). c.A person convicted of a second offense under subsection a. shall be subject to a fine of  not less than $100.00 or more than $250.00 and shall not be assessed any motor vehicle penalty points pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5). d.A person convicted of a third or subsequent offense under subsection a. shall be subject to a fine of not less than $200.00 or more than $500.00 and shall be assessed motor vehicle penalty points pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5). e.An offense committed under this section that occurs more than five years after the prior offense shall not be considered a subsequent offense for the purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points under subsection d. of this section. f.In addition to any fine, fee or other charge imposed pursuant to law, the court shall assess a person convicted of an offense under subsection a. of this section a surcharge of $250 which shall be collected by the court and distributed to the Division of Revenue in the Department of the Treasury as a New Jersey Merit Rating Plan surcharge pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) of subsection b. of section 6 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:29A-35).  THIS MEANS FOR YOUR THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF THIS STATUTE, YOU WILL BE CHARGED 4 POINTS.      The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen and Associates will provide all potential clients with : 1. Our Written Agreement to Provide Municipal Court Legal Services  2.  Municipal Court Information Sheet   We request all potential clients fill out the Municipal Court Information Sheet. You also need to bring in, or fax or mail us: 1. Copies of the ticket and any hearing notice. 2. A check or money order. You can also pay by Visa, Master Charge or American Express over the phone and by fax. You should keep the Agreement to Provide Legal Services for your records. Once we receive the fee paid we will prepare a Letter of Representation to the Court, Prosecutor and you. We  recommend our clients meet with us once prior to the court date.    Representation/ What We will do for you.  We will review and research necessary statutes and caselaw,  contact the prosecutor, prepare defenses and determine mitigating factors. 1. Telephone consultation with client; 2. Office consultation with client, if requested; 3. Offer sound legal advice to client, plus access to our legal info website www.NJLaws.com 4. Preparation of letter of representation to Municipal Court; 5. Preparation of letter of representation to Municipal Court Prosecutor; 6. Preparation of statement to provide legal services; 7. Copies of all correspondence to Court and Prosecutor to client; 8. Opening of file. If client comes to our office, they may have a free client case folder, Municipal Court brochure, DMV points brochure, and Website brochure; 9. Review of necessary statutes and case law; 10. Draft Defense by Affidavit 11. Determine defense and mitigating factors; 12. Miscellaneous correspondence, preparation and drafting of pleadings and legal documents in contested serious cases; 13. Review documents supplied by client and court; 14. Travel to Municipal Court; 15. Negotiations with the Prosecutor and Representation in Municipal Court. 16. Preparation of End of Case Letter and client questionnaire. 17. Free Brochures provided on other legal topics such as Workers Comp, Wills, Personal Injury 18. Free subscription to monthly e-mail newsletter. Provide your email address. 19. Follow up telephone advice [If you call, provide the specific questions with the message]. 20. Invitation to client socials/ seminars and Community events via email. 21. Hold and maintain file for seven years in storage as free client service.     Other Legal Services.  You and the Law Firm may make additional agreements to provide for legal services not covered by the Agreement. Without such agreements, the Law Firm is not required to do any additional work or any of the following:  (a)  Provide any legal services after the decision of the trial court;  (b) Appeal any decisions of the trial court or make additional appearances    after appearing in Court;  (c)  provide other legal services or advice not set forth above; or  (d)  Represent you in any other court or Tribunal      Your Responsibility- Please read carefully and follow instructions to help us help you 1. You must fully cooperate with the Law Firm and provide all information relevant to the issues involved in this matter. This includes providing details on what you told the police and court. 2 You must notify the court and the law office immediately if your address or phone numbers change. 3 Under the NJ Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules, we cannot send a letter of representation to the court until the Retainer is paid. All fees and requirements under this written retainer agreement and any other written documents must be complied with. Failure to comply with all requirements shall permit the law office to withdraw its offer of representation. The Law Firm will also withdraw at your request. You must advise our office and the Court in writing. 4. Pay your fines immediately. 5. If you call, you must provide your questions to our receptionist.

39:6B-2 Driving Without Insurance - Strict Liability and Substantial Penalties Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with driving without insurance and other serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.         The mandatory penalties imposed for driving without insurance is greater than the first offender penalties for drunk driving or possession of marijuana. Mandatory penalties include automatic loss of license for one year, $300.00 fine and a period of community service to be determined by the Municipal Court. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 The no car insurance statute is one of the few strict liability statutes. Every owner or registered owner of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state shall maintain motor vehicle coverage, under provisions approved by the Commissioner of Insurance. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 There are also court costs and insurance surcharges of $250.00 per year for three years. Failure to produce at the time of trial an insurance card or insurance policy covering the date of the offense creates a rebuttable presumption that the person was uninsured when charged with the offense. 39:6B-2 Failure to carry motor vehicle insurance coverage First offense: Fine and a period of community service as determined by the court, and suspension of driving privileges for 1 year $300 $1000 plus court costs Plus 9 car insurance points and $750 in MVC surcharges per offense Subsequent offense: Fine and shall be subject to 14 days imprisonment, and 30 days community service and suspension of driving privileges for 2 years from date of conviction fine up to $5000 plus court costs Plus 9 car insurance points and $750 in MVC surcharges per offense          In State v. Kopp, 171 NJ Super 528 (Law Div. 1980), the courts established that knowledge of lack of insurance is not a defense. The legislative intent is clear that knowledge of lack of insurance is not an essential element which must be proved in order to sustain a conviction of an owner who operates a car without insurance. However, the section which imposes penalties against an individual who operates a motor vehicle without liability insurance does not apply to a New Jersey resident who is driving an automobile owned by an out-of-state friend who had been in New Jersey for five weeks. State v. Arslanouk, 67 NJ Super 387 (App. Div. 1979)         The Appellate Division, in the State v. Hochman, 188 NJ Super 382 (App. Div. 1982) examined and reversed a conviction for operating without liability insurance where the State failed to carry its burden of proving that an automobile liability insurance was lawfully canceled. In this fact specific case, defendant was charged with operating a vehicle he owned without insurance. It was stipulated that because of long hours defendant worked, he had asked his wife to look after household matters, including insurance matters, and gave her several thousand dollars each month to pay for them. Defendant Hochmans wife arranged through an insurance broker to have Allstate insure the vehicle. The insurance broker then arranged to finance the insurance premiums through a Lee Finance financial service. The defendants wife then paid the broker and agreed to pay the balance to the financial service in monthly installments of $48.00. Id at 384.         Thereafter, defendant Hochmans wife made payments to the financial service through October 13, 1979. On October 15, 1979 Allstate informed defendants wife by mail that there was due and owing a premium of $331.00 and payment should be made immediately. The defendants wife notified the broker that she had received a letter from Allstate and reminded the broker that the insurance premiums were being financed through the finance agency pursuant to financing agreement arranged by it and therefore she did not have to pay the balance of the account.         The insurance broker informed the Defendant Hochmans wife that it would investigate the problem and contact her. In January 1980, because the defendants wife had not heard from the insurance broker, she again contacted the insurance broker and informed him that she had received no further correspondence from Allstate. She inquired into the status of the insurance of the vehicle, the broker informed the defendants wife they were still investigating the problem and would contact her when it had been resolved. It was further stipulated in Court that defendant was never told by his wife of the finance agreement or of the difficulties she had encountered with the insurance. In May 1980, defendant was transferred to another office and needed to use the car to get to work. According to stipulated facts, defendants wife told the defendant that the vehicle could be driven. Defendant, relying upon what his wife had told him and believing that the vehicle was insured, drove the vehicle until July 15, 1980 when he was charged with violating the compulsory insurance provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.         The insurance broker, as an agent, had issued an insurance identification card indicating the insurance would remain in effect from the period August 28, 1979 to August 28, 1980. In December 1979 defendant and his wife moved from the residence in Montclair and left a forwarding address. Thereafter in preparing for trial defendant learned that in October and November 1979 Lee Finance had liquidated without informing its clients, including defendants wife.         Although Allstate claimed it mailed a cancellation notice, it stipulated that it had mailed the cancellation notice to an incorrect address, mailing it to 313 Park Street rather than 314 Park Street. The broker, First City, never informed defendants wife, despite her inquiry, that Allstate had canceled the insurance policy or that the finance agency had liquidated, or that she could reinstate the policy by paying the balance due on the annual premium. The Appellate Division noted that in order to convict a defendant-owner of operating a motor vehicle in violation of the insurance provisions, the State did not have to show a culpable mental state, i.e., that defendant knew his vehicle was uninsured. The State simply had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant owned the vehicle, (2) the vehicle was registered in New Jersey, (3) defendant operated the vehicle or caused it to be operated upon any public road or highway in this State, and (4) the vehicle was without liability insurance coverage required by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1. Id at 387.         The Appellate Division held that the first three elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The pivotal issue was whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the fourth element of the defense, that the vehicle was uninsured. The question was thus whether the liability insurance policy had been lawfully and effectively canceled when Defendant Hochman was charged for the offense. The Court found that Allstate had not properly canceled the insurance policy. The Court held;         A notice of cancellation of a policy of automobile liability insurance is effective in this State only if it is based on one or more statutorily enumerated reasons, including the nonpayment of premiums. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-7(A)(a). Moreover, prior to March 10, 1981, where, as here, the cancellation was for nonpayment of premiums, the notice of cancellation must have been mailed or delivered by the insurance carrier (here Allstate) to the insured (here either defendant or his wife) at least ten days prior to the effective date of cancellation and must have been accompanied by a statement of the reason given for such cancellation. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8. Proof of mailing of the notice of cancellation to the named insured at the address shown in the policy was deemed sufficient proof of notice. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10. Under this latter statue, cancellation was effective whether or not the insured actually received notice of cancellation because proof of mailing, not proof of receipt, was the determinative factor. See Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group, 77 N.J. 228, 234 (1978. Proof of mailing the notice, however, is not conclusive on the issue. The insured may still offer proof that he never received the notice for the purpose of refuting the hypothesis of mailing. Id. at 235. Thus, in Weathers, the Supreme Court held:         Although the inference of non-mailing provided by evidence of non-receipt might in most cases be outweighed by the inferences of mailing which may be drawn from a certificate of mailing whose reliability has been established, we discern no cogent reason for depriving the trier of fact of such evidence by holding it inadmissible , they are not conclusive of that issue and do not preclude the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in the face of a claim of non-receipt so as to entitle the insurer to judgment as a matter of law. See Sudduth v. Commonwealth County Mutual Ins. Co., 454 S. W. 2d 196 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1970); 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 2519; cf. Fitzpatrick v. Merchants and Manufacturers Fire Ins. Co., 122 N.J.L. 468 (E. &A. 1939). The contrary holding of Womack v. Fenton, 28 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1953), on this point is hereby overruled. Permitting the fact finder to consider the addressee-insureds denial of receipt of the notice of cancellation does not improperly add to the insurers statutory burden of proving mailing by requiring it to prove actual receipt of the notice since such testimony is admissible only as the basis for an inference of its non-mailing. The insurer still need only prove constructive notice by adequately establishing that the notice of cancellation was mailed. Hochman at 388-389 Weathers at 235-236         The court noted that although Allstate claimed that a notice of cancellation was sent to the defendants wife, this did not establish that the notice satisfied the statutory requirement of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8. There is no proof that the notice mailed to the named insured (assuming that defendants wife was the insured named in the policy) or that it was mailed to the address shown in the policy, or that its contents complied with statutory requirements. The court held thus, we are constrained to hold that the State failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Allstate automobile liability insurance policy covering defendants vehicle was lawfully canceled. The Allstate policy therefore was presumptively in full force and effect... and defendants conviction for violating the compulsory insurance provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 cannot stand. Hochman at 389-390.         The insurance statutes under Title 19 of the New Jersey laws contain provisions which sometimes provide that all members of a household are covered under a policy issued to one member even if their name is not set forth on the policy. The uninsured defendant who lives with someone who owns an insured car may be included under that persons policy.         Operation is different in non-insurance matters than in drunk driving cases. A defendant who is seated in the drivers seat, behind the steering wheel of a vehicle that is under tow and was in physical control of the vehicle did not operate the vehicle for the purposes of prohibiting operating the vehicle while suspended, operating uninsured vehicle and operating unregistered vehicle, where the vehicle did not have an engine and incapable of being operated under its own power. Counsel can argue the state must prove the defendant drove the vehicle. State v. Derby, 256 N.J. Super. 702, (Law Div. 1992).         In a case involving Personal Injury Protection/ No Fault PIP benefits the Appellate Division recently ruled that an insurance company did not properly mail a notice of cancellation, thus the policy was not canceled. In Hodges v. Pennsylvania National Insurance Company, _____ NJ Super. _____ (App. Div. 1992), plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident operating a vehicle owned by her mother. Plaintiff filed a PIP suit against the insurance company which had refused to pay medical bills and property damage. Defendants insurance company claimed it canceled Alva Hodges policy on December 16, 1988 for failure to remit the premium payment. Defendant submitted two pages of a November 28, 1988 JUA Mailing List, which indicated Alva Hodges as an insured who was scheduled to be sent a notice of cancellation. The mailing list contained two November 28 stamps of the Harrisburg Post Office and two stamps of postage for the numerous letters of $39.00 and $99.75. The two postage stamps together totaled $138.75. The list claimed a total mailing of 640 notices. Plaintiff pointed out that a mailing of 640 notices at $.25 per piece (the 1988 postage stamp price) should have totaled $160.00. Because defendant paid only $138.75, plaintiff contends that all the lists and notices may not have been mailed. The mailing list also contained a signature and certification of one of the defendants employees.         Plaintiffs counsel in Hodges pointed out that the Post Offices standard proof of mailing procedure differed from defendants use of a preprinted mailing list. Plaintiff pointed out that the US Postal Service utilizes a Certificate of Mailing, PS Form 3817, for the purposes documenting proof of mailing by regular mail. Prior to the stamping of this receipt, the Postal Service employees individually compares the receipt with the item being mailed. These forms are available in advance from the Post Office. (A copy of the first class mailing Certificate of Mailing was included as a footnote to the Courts opinion.) The Hodges Court noted that N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 specifically enumerates the circumstances on which a notice of cancellation is effective:         no written notice of cancellation or of intention not to renew sent by an insurer to an insured in accordance with the provisions of an automobile insurance shall be effective unless a. (1) it is sent by certified mail, or (2) at the time of the mailing of said notice by regular mail, the insurer has obtained from the Post Office Department a date stamped proof of mailing showing the name and address of the insured and b. the insurer has retained a duplicate copy of the mailed notice which is certified to be true. Slip op at 6. [Emphasis added by the Court.]         In order to be effective, notice of cancellation must be set in strict compliance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10. Citing Lopez v. New Jersey Automobile Full Underwriting Association, 239 NJ Super. 13, 20, (App. Div.), certif. den. 122 N.J. 131 (1990) (absence of proof of personal knowledge of mailing by postal employee or insurer employee renders notice ineffective). The Court questioned whether the stamped proof of payment of money in postage was proof of mailing. The Appellate Division in Hodges noted that our Courts have interpreted the statute to require a precise proof of mailing, usually the official U.S. Postal Service Certificate of Mailing.         In Celino v. General Accident Insurance, 211 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986), the Court ruled that this specific postal certificate of mailing satisfied the statutes proof of mailing requirement. Celino at 540-541 (determining that the insurers notice was ineffective because insured failed to retain a duplicate copy of the notice, thereby violating part (b) of the statute). The Appellate Division in Celino determined that defendants proof of payment of postage and the employees certification fell far short of the quality of proof inherent in an official post office certificate. Because the defendants proofs were insufficient to establish compliance with the statute, there existed an unresolved issues of fact. The Appellate Division found that the trial court erred and granting in summary judgment and remanded the question as to notice for further proceedings.         If there is a question involving improper cancellation or improper notice, we would suggest your attorney prepare a subpoena to the insurance company and also a hand delivered subpoena to your insurance broker. You may discover notice of cancellation was improper or notices mailed to the wrong address. We all know the poor track record by JUA and MTF companies.         If a husband and wife, or both, are named in the policy, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Carriere 170 N.J. Super. 437, 450 (Law Div. 1979) supports the proposition that both husband and wife named in the policy should receive notice.         A cancellation notice is invalid if issued before the premium due date. Recently, in Christian v. Ormsby, _____ N.J. Super _____ (Law Div. decided December 18, 1992), the court held under N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8, an automobile insurer may not issue a cancellation notice to the insured for non-payment of premiums before the date on which the premium is due. (This case also dealt with the incompetent JUA.) The Christian notices of cancellation and a reminder notice were mailed by Liberty Mutual. However, the court found that the notice was ineffective to cancel the policy before the accident Plaintiff Christian was involved in. The court found that although the notice issued by Liberty Mutual to the Christians on October 21, 1987 stated its reason for cancellation as non-payment of premium, the court found that, on the date the notice was mailed, the Christians premium to the JUA was not past due and the Christians were not yet in default.         The court also rejected the JUAs argument that the cancellation notice could have been mailed at any time after the premium notice, so long as it did not become effective until after the due date. The court interpreted the statutory language requires 15 days notice of cancellation in a language referring to non-payment of premium together to imply a legislative intent to provide with a 15-day grace period after default in the payment of an automobile insurance policy premium before the insurer is able to effectively cancel the policy. The purpose is to allow defaulting policyholders an opportunity during that grace period to pay their premiums and to keep the policy in force. Consequently, any cancellation notice issued before such default is premature and invalid.         A bad check will permit insurer to cancel insurance policy. In Abdel-Rahman v. Ludas, _____ NJ Super _____ (App. Div. decided July 7, 1993), an insurers acceptance of a check in payment of a premium is conditioned upon payment by the drawee institution. An insureds failure to pay the premium, which occurs when the check is dishonored, entitles the insurer to cancel the policy. On August 13, 1990, Ohio Casualty issued a three-month, short-term reinstatement of policy. Included in the reinstatement letter to the insured was a notice advising the reinstatement would be considered void from its inception if the check accepted in payment of the reinstatement was dishonored when presented to the drawee bank.         On August 22, Ohio Casualty learned that the check was dishonored by the insureds bank. Having a policy of presenting a check twice for payment, Ohio Casualty redeposited the check that same date. The check was again returned for insufficient funds on August 24. On both occasions the bank mailed notices of the dishonoring to the insured. The insureds bank statement also indicated that the checks had been dishonored.         Ohio Casualty canceled insured Ludas policy on September 6, 1990. On September 12, 1990, the company informed Ludas of the cancellation, which was retroactively effective July 29, 1990. The insured did no dispute the facts but claimed that the family made a mistake and deposited the money into the wrong account. Both the motion judge and the Appellate Division found that mere delivery of the check, a worthless piece of paper, to the insurer was not enough to keep the policy in effect.         The non-insurance NJSBA 39:6B-2 statute provides there is a rebuttable presumption of no insurance if no card or policy produced. Remember, however, that a presumption does not equal guilty.         The charge of simple operation without insurance by the non-owner presents additional viable defenses to the charge of no insurance. There is not a strict liability provision involving mere operators. The State must prove the operator knew or should have known from the attendant circumstances that the motor vehicle was without motor vehicle liability coverage. Such facts can be gathered from the relationship between the parties, whether or not the vehicle had a valid inspection sticker and testimony by the owner who often is also issued an uninsured motorist charge.         In Matlad v. US Services, 174 NJ Super. 499 417 A. 2d 46 (App. Div. 1980), where husband canceled policy without telling wife, deletion was void as against public policy and coverage continued for wife. The defendant/owner must operate or cause the car to be operated. If a driver took the car without permission that day, the owner did not cause the vehicle to be operated.         The State is still required to provide discovery. Occasionally a case is dismissed because the State failed to provide discovery. The bottom line is never let your insurance expire. Mandatory penalties are automatic loss of license for one year, $300.00 fine and a period of community service to be determined by the Municipal Court. If you dont have insurance, dont drive.         No insurance penalties increased 2002         39:6B-2. Penalties         2. Any owner or registrant of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State who operates or causes to be operated a motor vehicle upon any public road or highway in this State without motor vehicle liability insurance coverage required by this act, and any operator who operates or causes a motor vehicle to be operated and who knows or should know from the attendant circumstances that the motor vehicle is without motor vehicle liability insurance coverage required by this act shall be subject, for the first offense, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1,000 and a period of community service to be determined by the court, and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year from the date of conviction.? Upon subsequent conviction, he shall be subject to a fine of up to $5,000 and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of 14 days and shall be ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days, which shall be of such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances, and shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle for a period of two years from the date of his conviction, and, after the expiration of said period, he may make application to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles for a license to operate a motor vehicle, which application may be granted at the discretion of the director. The directors discretion shall be based upon an assessment of the likelihood that the individual will operate or cause a motor vehicle to be operated in the future without the insurance coverage required by this act. A complaint for violation of this act may be made to a municipal court at any time within six months after the date of the alleged offense.         Failure to produce at the time of trial an insurance identification card or an insurance policy which was in force for the time of operation for which the offense is charged creates a rebuttable presumption that the person was uninsured when charged with a violation of this section.         L.1972,c.197,s.2; amended 1983, c.141, s.1; 1987, c.46; 1988, c.156, s.15; 1990, c.8, s.49; 1997, c.151, s.12.         39:6B-3. Uninsured motorist prevention fund The Uninsured Motorist Prevention Fund (hereinafter referred to as the fund ) is established as a nonlapsing, revolving fund into which shall be deposited all revenues from the fines imposed pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1972, c. 197 (C. 39:6B-2). Interest received on moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund. The fund shall be administered by the Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Law and Public Safety.? Moneys in the fund shall be allocated and used for the purpose of the administrative expenses of the fund and enforcement of the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law, P.L. 1972, c. 197 (C. 39:6B-1 et seq.) by the Division of Motor Vehicles.         L.1983, c. 141, s. 2, eff. April 20, 1983.

Arrested for DUI?

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets throughout New Jersey, including drivers charged with DUI/DWI and refusal. Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You will have to pay fines in court, or receive points on your driver's license. A conviction will require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. MVC [Division of Motor Vehicles] and have your license suspended. In New Jersey, the Judge does not have to rule that you were drunk. The prosecutor only needs to prove a driver was under the influence of alcohol. Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen offers information and can provide experienced attorney representation for Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations. When your driver's license is in jeopardy, or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Please schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter. Our website NJLaws.com provides information on traffic offenses of which we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for Driving Under Influence and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations. In New Jersey Driving Under Influence (DUI) and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) are the same charge. The following is the new DWI law in New Jersey with all of its amendments: N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 Driving While Intoxicated 39:4-50. (a) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be subject: (1) For the first offense: (i) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or the or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone and acetate, amyl nitrite or amyl nitrate or their isomers, benzene, butyl alcohol, butyl nitrite, butyl nitrate or their isomers, ethyl acetate, ethyl alcohol, ethyl nitrite or ethyl nitrate, ethylene dichloride, isobutyl alcohol or isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, n-propyl alcohol, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, propyl nitrite or propyl nitrate or their isomers, toluene, toluol or xylene or any other chemical substance capable of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction or the dulling of the brain or nervous system as a result of the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of such chemical substance. Whenever an operator of a motor vehicle has been involved in an accident resulting in death, bodily injury or property damage, a police officer shall consider that fact along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section. A conviction of a violation of a law of a substantially similar nature in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction is a signatory to the Interstate Driver License Compact pursuant to P.L. 1966, c.73 (C. 39: 5D-1 et seq.), shall constitute a prior conviction under this subsection unless the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction in the other jurisdiction was based exclusively upon a violation of a proscribed blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.08%. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the forfeiture, suspension or revocation of the driving privilege imposed by the court under this section shall commence immediately, run through the offender's seventeenth birthday and continue from that date for the period set by the court pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection. A court that imposes a term of imprisonment for a first or second offense under this section may sentence the person so convicted to the county jail, to the workhouse of the county wherein the offense was committed, to an inpatient rehabilitation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or other facility approved by the chief of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit in the Department of Health and Senior Services. For a third or subsequent offense a person shall not serve a term of imprisonment at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center as provided in subsection (f). A person who has been convicted of a previous violation of this section need not be charged as a second or subsequent offender in the complaint made against him in order to render him liable to the punishment imposed by this section on a second or subsequent offender, but if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes. (b) A person convicted under this section must satisfy the screening, evaluation, referral, program and fee requirements of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, and of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers and a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The sentencing court shall inform the person convicted that failure to satisfy such requirements shall result in a mandatory two-day term of imprisonment in a county jail and a driver license revocation or suspension and continuation of revocation or suspension until such requirements are satisfied, unless stayed by court order in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, or R.S. 39:5-22. Upon sentencing, the court shall forward to the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit a copy of a person's conviction record. A fee of $100.00 shall be payable to the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and Enforcement Fund established pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 1983, c.531 (C. 26: 2B-32) to support the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. (c) Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person so convicted and forward such license or licenses to the chief administrator. The court shall inform the person convicted that if he is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties established in R.S. 39:3-40. The person convicted shall be informed orally and in writing. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40. In the event that a person convicted under this section is the holder of any out-of-State driver's license, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the chief administrator, who shall, in turn, notify appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, revoke the nonresident's driving privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State, in accordance with this section. Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall notify the person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties for a second, third or subsequent violation of this section. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of this section. (d) The chief administrator shall promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.) in order to establish a program of alcohol education and highway safety, as prescribed by this act. (e) Any person accused of a violation of this section who is liable to punishment imposed by this section as a second or subsequent offender shall be entitled to the same rights of discovery as allowed defendants pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. (f) The counties, in cooperation with the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse and the commission, but subject to the approval of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, shall designate and establish on a county or regional basis Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers. These centers shall have the capability of serving as community treatment referral centers and as court monitors of a person's compliance with the ordered treatment, service alternative or community service. All centers established pursuant to this subsection shall be administered by a counselor certified by the Alcohol and Drug Counselor Certification Board of New Jersey or other professional with a minimum of five years experience in the treatment of alcoholism. All centers shall be required to develop individualized treatment plans for all persons attending the centers; provided that the duration of any ordered treatment or referral shall not exceed one year. It shall be the center's responsibility to establish networks with the community alcohol and drug education, treatment and rehabilitation resources and to receive monthly reports from the referral agencies regarding a person's participation and compliance with the program. Nothing in this subsection shall bar these centers from developing their own education and treatment programs; provided that they are approved by the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. Upon a person's failure to report to the initial screening or any subsequent ordered referral, the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center shall promptly notify the sentencing court of the person's failure to comply. Required detention periods at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers shall be determined according to the individual treatment classification assigned by the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. Upon attendance at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, a person shall be required to pay a per diem fee of $75.00 for the first offender program or a per diem fee of $100.00 for the second offender program, as appropriate. Any increases in the per diem fees after the first full year shall be determined pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the person permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10% to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $250 nor more than $400 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of three months; (ii) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.10% or higher, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or the person permits another person who is under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control, or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $500 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of not less than seven months nor more than one year; (iii) For a first offense, a person also shall be subject to the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.). (2) For a second violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of not less than $500.00 nor more than $1,000.00, and shall be ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days, which shall be of such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 48 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 90 days, and shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of two years upon conviction, and, after the expiration of said period, he may make application to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission for a license to operate a motor vehicle, which application may be granted at the discretion of the chief administrator, consistent with subsection (b) of this section. For a second violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.) or shall have his registration certificate and registration plates revoked for two years under the provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1). (3) For a third or subsequent violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of $1,000.00, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and shall thereafter forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for 10 years. For a third or subsequent violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.) or shall have his registration certificate and registration plates revoked for 10 years under the provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1). As used in this section, the phrase "narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug" includes an inhalant or other substance containing a chemical capable of releasing any toxic vapors or fumes for the purpose of inducing a condition of intoxication, such as any glue, cement or any other substance containing one Commissioner of Health and Senior Services in consultation with the Governor's Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.). The centers shall conduct a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The Commissioner of Health and Senior Services shall adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.), in order to effectuate the purposes of this subsection. (g) When a violation of this section occurs while: (1) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property; (2) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or (3) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution, the convicted person shall: for a first offense, be fined not less than $500 or more than $800, be imprisoned for not more than 60 days and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than one year or more than two years; for a second offense, be fined not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000, perform community service for a period of 60 days, be imprisoned for not less than 96 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 180 days, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served performing community service in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than four years; and, for a third offense, be fined $2,000, imprisoned for 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of 20 years; the period of license suspension shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person. A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection. It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session. (h) A court also may order a person convicted pursuant to subsection a. of this section, to participate in a supervised visitation program as either a condition of probation or a form of community service, giving preference to those who were under the age of 21 at the time of the offense. Prior to ordering a person to participate in such a program, the court may consult with any person who may provide useful information on the defendant's physical, emotional and mental suitability for the visit to ensure that it will not cause any injury to the defendant. The court also may order that the defendant participate in a counseling session under the supervision of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit prior to participating in the supervised visitation program. The supervised visitation program shall be at one or more of the following facilities which have agreed to participate in the program under the supervision of the facility's personnel and the probation department: (1) a trauma center, critical care center or acute care hospital having basic emergency services, which receives victims of motor vehicle accidents for the purpose of observing appropriate victims of drunk drivers and victims who are, themselves, drunk drivers; (2) a facility which cares for advanced alcoholics or drug abusers, to observe persons in the advanced stages of alcoholism or drug abuse; or (3) if approved by a county medical examiner, the office of the county medical examiner or a public morgue to observe appropriate victims of vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers. As used in this section, "appropriate victim" means a victim whose condition is determined by the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer to be appropriate for demonstrating the results of accidents involving drunk drivers without being unnecessarily gruesome or traumatic to the defendant. If at any time before or during a visitation the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer determine that the visitation may be or is traumatic or otherwise inappropriate for that defendant, the visitation shall be terminated without prejudice to the defendant. The program may include a personal conference after the visitation, which may include the sentencing judge or the judge who coordinates the program for the court, the defendant, defendant's counsel, and, if available, the defendant's parents to discuss the visitation and its effect on the defendant's future conduct. If a personal conference is not practicable because of the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction, conflicting time schedules, or any other reason, the court shall require the defendant to submit a written report concerning the visitation experience and its impact on the defendant. The county, a court, any facility visited pursuant to the program, any agents, employees, or independent contractors of the court, county, or facility visited pursuant to the program, and any person supervising a defendant during the visitation, are not liable for any civil damages resulting from injury to the defendant, or for civil damages associated with the visitation which are caused by the defendant, except for willful or grossly negligent acts intended to, or reasonably expected to result in, that injury or damage. The Supreme Court may adopt court rules or directives to effectuate the purposes of this subsection. (i) In addition to any other fine, fee, or other charge imposed pursuant to law, the court shall assess a person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section a surcharge of $100, of which amount $50 shall be payable to the municipality in which the conviction was obtained and $50 shall be payable to the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey for deposit into the General Fund. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.14 Operation of a motor vehicle by person who has consumed alcohol but is under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages; penalties Any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01% or more, but less than 0.08%, by weight of alcohol in his blood, shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State or shall be prohibited from obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period of not less than 30 or more than 90 days beginning on the date he becomes eligible to obtain a license or on the day of conviction, whichever is later, and shall perform community service for a period of not less than 15 or more than 30 days. In addition, the person shall satisfy the program and fee requirements of an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or participate in a program of alcohol education and highway safety as prescribed by the chief administrator. The penalties provided under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to the penalties which the court may impose under N.J.S. 2C:33-15, R.S. 33:1-81, R.S. 39:4-50 or any other law. N.J.S.A. 39:4-51 Sentence for violation of section N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 must be served; release on work release program A person who has been convicted of a first or second violation of section 39:4-50 of this Title, and in pursuance thereof has been imprisoned in a county jail or workhouse in the county in which the offense was committed, shall not, after commitment, be released therefrom until the term of imprisonment imposed has been served. A person imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse may in the discretion of the court, be released on a work release program. No warden or other officer having custody of the county jail or workhouse shall release therefrom a person so committed, unless the person has been released by the court on a work release program, until the sentence has been served. A person sentenced to an inpatient rehabilitation program may upon petition by the treating agency be released, by the court, to an outpatient rehabilitation program for the duration of the original sentence. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere in any way with the operation of a writ of habeas corpus, a proceeding in lieu of the prerogative writs, or an appeal. The administrator shall adopt such rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of this section as he shall deem necessary. CONCLUSION The State must clearly prove certain conditions, among others: 1. The equipment was in proper working order was periodically inspected in accordance with procedures. Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 81 and 82 (1984) 2. The operator was qualified i.e., properly certified to administer the instrument. Id.; State v. Ernst, 230 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 1989), cert den. 117 N.J. 40; 3. The test was given correctly-- ie in accordance with official instructions and accepted procedures. Romano, supra at 81 and 82 The law entitles drunk driving defendants to pre trial discovery. R.3:13 3; R.7:4 2(h); State v. Young, 242 N.J. Super. 467, 470 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Utsch, 184 N.J. Super. 575, 579 (App. Div. 1982). Due process requires the State disclose evidence that is material to either guilt or punishment; indeed, the prosecution has a constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence that would raise reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976). A wide variety of materials in the State's possession could constitute exculpatory information to which a defendant is entitled. Ford, supra at 52 A demand for discovery has been served upon the prosecutor who has the responsibility to answer. State v. Tull, 234 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (Law Div. 1989). A defendant's right to discovery is not dependent upon an appraisal of the beneficial value of the material sought to be discovered. State v. Polito, 116 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 1977), Ford, supra at 51). Thus, a prosecutor is expected to act reasonably when responding to a discovery demand. Tull, supra at 496. The prosecutor may not refuse a discovery demand simply because the information or materials sought are not in the municipal offices or within easy reach. Id. at 495. The municipal prosecutor cannot refuse production on the ground that the requested information is not known by the prosecutor personally to be in existence when its existence is either common knowledge of the police department or when the knowledge could be obtained by reasonable inquiry. Id. at 500. The municipal prosecutor must either object to what the prosecutor perceives to be irrelevant discovery requests, or respond within 10 days of the receipt of the defendant's request for discovery. Ford supra at 51; see Tull, supra at 500. The municipal prosecutor may be sanctioned for failing to provide discovery. R.3:13 ; see State v. Audette, 201 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1985) State v. Polasky, 216 N.J. Super. 549 (Law Div. 1986). A defendant who believes the State has not supplied relevant materials reasonably required for the defense may give notice to the State and the court prior to the date set for commencement of trial where possible. Ford, supra at 52. Information relating to prerequisite conditions establishing reliability is highly relevant, Ford, supra at 52, and extremely material. Id. at 51. Thus, information concerning conditions under which tests were held, the machine operator's competence, the particular machine's state of repair and identification, and documentation of the ampoule used for defendant's breath tests are all relevant inquiries. Id. Conclusion If charged with Driving While Intoxicated, immediately schedule an in-office appointment with a trial attorney. Don't rely on a real estate attorney, public defender or a family member who simply attended law school. When your driving privileges and ability to drive to work is on the line, hire an experienced attorney. KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030 TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings. Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a weekly basis. He also argued all pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New Jersey. He has also served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Berkeley Heights, Carteret, East Brunswick, Jamesburg, South Brunswick, South River and South Plainfield for conflict cases. Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had substantial success. Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office. He represented indigent individuals facing consequences of magnitude. He was in Court trying cases and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters. Every case he personally handled and prepared. His resume sets forth the numerous bar associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal profession and providing quality representation to clients. Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Department as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.