Wednesday, December 31, 2014

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc. Dunellen, Middlesex, Piscataway, South Plainfield, Edison, Metuchen, Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Carteret, Highland Park, New Brunswick, North Brunswick, Milltown, East Brunswick, South River, Sayreville, South Amboy, Old Bridge, Spotswood, South Brunswick, Plainsboro, Cranbury, Monroe, Jamesburg,

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended


No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition. 

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days. 

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

911 call gave cause to stop car for dwi


STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
COREEN CLARK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Decided November 21, 2014, before the Honorable Edward A. Jerejian, J.S.C. 
On appeal from Garfield Municipal Court, Docket No. 13-93 
 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 
APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS 
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 
DOCKET NO.: 13-93 
BMA: 004-10-14 
___________________________________________________________ 
This matter is on appeal from the Garfield Municipal Court. On March 27, 2013, Coreen Clark was issued the following three summonses: (1) Driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; (2) DWI in a school zone contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)(1); and (3) refusal contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. (T31-3 to 11). 
On November 25, 2013, defendant appeared with counsel in the Garfield Municipal Court for trial before the Honorable Giuseppe C. Randazzo. (T). At the conclusion of trial, the Judge found the defendant guilty of DWI, DWI in a school zone, and refusal. (T111-4 to 12). 
This was the defendant’s second DWI conviction. The trial court merged the DWI with the DWI in a school zone and sentenced the defendant to: $807 in fines; $33 in 2 

court costs; $50 Victims of Crime Compensation Board (“VCCB”) assessment; $75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund (“SNSF”) assessment; $200 DWI surcharge; four (4) year driver’s license suspension; 48 hours in an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (“IDRC”); two years with an ignition interlock device; and 45 days in Bergen County Jail. (T114-5 to 16). 
The following fines and penalties were imposed for the refusal: $807 in fines; $33 in court costs; $50 VCCB assessment; $75 SNSF assessment; $200 DWI surcharge; four (4) year driver’s license suspension; 48 hours in an IDRC; two years with an ignition interlock device; and 45 days in Bergen County Jail. The refusal penalties were to run concurrent to the sentence for DWI in a school zone. (T114-17 to 23). 
On December 12, 2013, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 27, 2013, at approximately 8:00 PM, Garfield Police Department dispatcher Joseph Calvitti (Calvitti) received a call from an unnamed concerned citizen reporting an erratic driver traveling on Outwater Lane. (T7-6 to T8-13). The anonymous caller informed Calvitti that a dark GMC with a partial plate of “L95” nearly struck multiple parked vehicles. (T8-17 to 24). At that point, Calvitti relayed that information to Officer Anthony Koptrya (Koptrya) and Officer Matio Pozo (Pozo) of the Garfield Police Department. (T8-25 to T9-12). Calvitti remained on the line with the anonymous caller and the caller conveyed to Calvitti that the defendant was traveling at a high rate of speed, again almost struck a couple of vehicles, and eventually made a left and pulled into the parking lot of the bar Three Wise Monks (bar). (T9-13 to T10-22). 
Upon arriving at the bar, Koptrya approached a dark colored GMC with license 3 

plate “L95CCZ.” (T15-19 to T16-1). Koptrya tapped the defendants window and advised her that he had stopped her due to a report of erratic driving. (T15-25 to T16-1). The Officer asked the defendant for her credentials, and in an attempt to hand over those credentials, the defendant dropped her license, struggled to produce her insurance card, and dropped her AAA card. (T16-9 to T17-12). Koptrya testifies that the defendant had watery and bloodshot eyes, she was unable to keep eye contact, and had a strong odor of alcohol emanating from her breath. (T17-23 to T18-10). It was at this point that the Officer asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle and when doing so, the defendant braced herself for support on the vehicle’s door. (T17-22 to T18-2). 
Officer Kopytra informed the defendant that he would be administering some field sobriety tests. (T18-23 to 25). The Officer administered both the horizontal gaze nystagmus and vertical gaze nystagmus test and at trial both parties stipulated that these test are only admissible for probable cause, and not toward indicia of intoxication. (T19-1 to 7). 
Next, the Officer administered the walk and turn test. (T19-9 to 10). The area where the test was to be performed was level and free of cracks and debris. (T19-13 to 14). When asked to perform the test, the Officer testifies that defendant said she wouldn’t put her foot in front of her and she was only here to pick up money. (T19-22 to 25). Furthermore, she stated that she barely drove because she knows her limit when she drinks. (T20-2 to 5). When the defendant was asked a second time to perform the test, she again refused. (T20-11 to 16). 
Lastly, Kopytra advised the defendant that he would be administering the one leg stand test. (T20-19 to 20). The defendant told the Officer that she would “not fucking do 4 

the test at all.” (T20-22 to 23; T21-1). 
At this point, Officer Kopytra placed the defendant under arrest and brought her to police headquarters. (T21-10 to 12). While in the Officers car, the defendant repetitively addressed the Officer as, “a fucking asshole,” “a fucking newbie,” and “a fucking pig with a hard-on.” (T21-18 to 25). 
At police headquarters, the defendant continued her disrespect toward the Officer and displayed a wide range of emotions such as being angry, being calm, and crying. (T28-3 to T29-14). She then informed Officer Koptrya that she won every DWI case and would beat this DWI case also. (T29-17 to 24). 
Officer Koptrya read the DMV Standard Statement to the defendant, and she refused to give a breath sample. (T24-9 to T25-5). He then read the defendant her miranda rights to which the defendant replied, “fuck you, you’re are an asshole.” (T26-3 to T27-10). At this point, Officer Koptrya concluded that the defendant was intoxicated and arrested the defendant and issued summonses for DWI, DWI in a school zone, and refusal. (T31-3 to 22). 
At trial, he defendant testified on her own behalf and claimed to have suffered from several medical condition such as: ADHD, asthma, anxiety, and bipolar depression. (T68-20 to 23). She testified that she informed the Officer that she was unable to perform the field sobriety test because of these medical conditions. (T70-25 to T71-10). Furthermore, the defendant contends that she attempted to do the walk and turn test, but it would have been impossible due to ground conditions, her medical conditions, and her shoes. (T72-2 to 14). 
Defendant admits to ignoring and eventually denying Officer Koptrya’s request to 5 

provide a breath sample. (T77-7 to 23). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellate Division has specified that the standard of review to be used by the Superior Court Law Division when hearing a municipal appeal is de novo. R. 3:23-8a. The function of the court is to determine the case completely anew on the record made in the Municipal Court, giving due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the magistrate to judge the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964). A trial de novo requires the trier to make findings of fact. The Law Division’s role is not the appellate function governed by the substantial evidence rule, but rather an independent fact-finding function in respect of Defendant’s guilt or innocence. State v. States, 44 N.J. 285, 293 (1965); R. 3:23-8a. Appellate courts should defer to the credibility findings of the trial court because they are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 475 (1999). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OFFICER KOPYTRA HAD REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO CONDUCT A MOTOR VEHICLE STOP. 
The defendant argues that Officer Kopytra lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a motor vehicle stop. 
The State argues that the defendant’s erratic driving, which was reported in a play-by-play manner by an anonymous caller, was sufficient probable cause to conduct a motor vehicle stop. 6 

A police officer is justified in conducting a motor vehicle stop when he has articulable and reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed a motor vehicle offense. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than the probable cause standard needed for an arrest. State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002). 
In State v. Amelio, the court found reasonable articulable suspicion when a defendant’s daughter called 9-1-1 and reported that the defendant was drunk and gave a vehicle description. 197 N.J. 207 (2008). In Navarette v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that the police may conduct a motor vehicle stop based on an anonymous tip pertaining to reckless driving. 134 S.Ct. 1683 (2014). 
In State v. Golotta, the Court found the police acted constitutionally when they conducted a motor vehicle stop solely on information provided to them by an anonymous caller. 178 N.J. 205, 221-222 (2003). The Court stated that the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment is met when the caller provides sufficient information, such as adequate description of the vehicle or its location, so the officer can verify the vehicle stopped is the same as the vehicle which was identified by the caller. Id. 
In this case, the anonymous caller reached Calvitti, a 9-1-1 dispatcher, through a call being placed to the Garfield Police Department. (T7-23 to T8-4). The caller informed Calvitti that the defendant was driving erratically and nearly hit multiple vehicles. (T8-7 to 22). Additionally, the caller informed Calvitti that the defendant was driving a dark GMC with partial license plate “L95” and gave up to date details of the route the defendant was taking, including the defendant pulling into the parking lot of the Three 7 

Wise Monks. (T8-17 to T10-8). Calvitti passed this information along to Officer Koptrya and Officer Pozo. (T9-2 to 12). The Officer found the defendant’s vehicle, which matched the description provided by the caller, parked where the anonymous caller said it would be. (T15-19 to 23; T48-20 to T49-8). 
For the reasons stated above, this Court agrees that Officer Koptrya had reasonable articulable suspicion to pursue a motor vehicle stop of the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENTS MADE FROM ANONYMOUS CALLER TO CALVITTI WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED HEARSAY. 
Defendant argues that the Trial Court erred when they allowed Calvitti to testify as to his conversation with the anonymous 911 caller. 
The State argues that this testimony was properly admitted into trial under N.J.R.E. 801(c)(3). 
According to N.J.R.E. 801(c)(3), present sense impression testimony is admissible if it is, “a statement of observation, description or explanation of an event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant was perceiving the event or condition and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.” 
In State v. Marsh, the court held that statements made by an anonymous informant while witnessing the event in question were inherently reliable and admissible during the trial. 162 N.J. Super. 290, 298-299 (Law. Div. 1978). The court stated that the information relayed was reliable because it was detailed and reported ongoing events. Id. 
In this case, the anonymous caller identified the make of the vehicle as well a partial license plate. (T8-19 to 22). The caller informed Calvitti, in detail, how and where the defendant was driving. (T8-6 to T10-8). Officer Koptrya found the defendants vehicle 8 

exactly where the anonymous caller said the vehicle would be. (T15-19 to 23). There is nothing in the evidence to show that the caller was not reliable. 
Therefore, the Trial Court properly allowed this evidence into trial pursuant to N.J.R.E. 801(c)(3). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY DE NOVO OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO A BREATHALYZER. 
Defendant argues that her asthma condition prevents her from being capable of providing a breath sample. 
The State argues that the defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer and has provided no evidence that her asthma prevents her from providing a breath sample. 
According to N.J.S.A 39:4-50.2, any person who operates a motor vehicle on a public road is deemed to have given consent to determine the content of alcohol in his blood. The officer must have reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving while intoxicated. Id. 
According to State v. Bernhardt, a charge for refusal is proper when “anything substantially short of an unqualified, unequivocal assent to an officer’s request that the arrested motorist take the test….” 245 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 1991). 
In this case, the defendant was driving erratically, refusing to attempt the field sobriety test, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and was displaying a wide range of emotions. After being advised of her rights and asked to take breathalyzer, the defendant first stayed silent. (T24-13 to 22). When asked again, Officer Koptrya testifies that the defendant refused to take the test. (T24-13 to T25-5). Defendant also admitted that she refused to take the test. (T77-7 to 23). At that point, the defendant did not inform the 9 

Officer that she could not take the test due to any medical conditions. Furthermore, the defendant offered no expert witnesses to testify to any of her medical conditions. 
For these reasons, this Court finds de novo that there is sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of refusal contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY DE NOVO OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CONTRAY TO N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. 
The defendant argues that there was not sufficient evidence submitted at trial to prove she was driving while intoxicated. 
The State argues there was sufficient observational evidence to prove the defendant was driving while intoxicated. 
According to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, a person shall not “operate a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquors.” A defendant need not be absolutely drunk to be guilty of this but need only be “imbibed to the extent that his physical coordination or mental faculties are deleteriously affected.” State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 164-165 (1964). 
Observational evidence alone is sufficient to establish that a defendant was driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Liberatore, 293, N.J. Super. 580,589 (Law. Div. 1996). The courts will consider a wide range of factors when determining whether defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cleverley, 348 N.J. Super. 455, 465 (App. Div. 2002) (sustaining conviction on defendant's driving without headlights on, smell of alcohol on defendant's breath, slurred speech, combative demeanor, difficulty standing, and inability to perform the field sobriety tests); State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super 244, 251-252 (App. 10 

Div. 2001) (sustaining conviction on defendant's watery eyes, slurred speech, inability to follow commands, defendant's admission that he had consumed alcohol, staggering while walking, and failure to complete field sobriety test). 
In this case, the defendant was seen by an anonymous caller driving erratically and almost hitting multiple vehicles. (T8-7 to 22). When the Officer asked for the defendant’s credentials, the defendant had difficulty producing them. (T16-7 to T17-12). Officers smelled a strong odor coming from the defendant’s breath and she had watery and bloodshot eyes. (T17-15 to T18-10). When exiting the vehicle, the defendant had to use the door to brace herself. (T18-11 to 19). The defendant refused to cooperate with any field sobriety test and was uncooperative with officers. (T18-23 to T21-2). Lastly, the defendant displayed a wide range of emotions from being angry, to being calm, to crying. 
Therefore, this court finds de novo, that there is sufficient evidence to determine the defendant was guilty of DWI through observational evidence contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED RELEVANT EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 403. 
The defendant argues that the Trial Judge improperly allowed prejudicial evidence into trial. 
The State argues that the evidence admitted was relevant and was properly admitted under N.J.R.E. 403. 
According to N.J.R.E 403, “relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, 11 

or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
The mere possibility that evidence may be prejudicial to the defendant does not justify exclusion. State v. Swing, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 253 (App. Div. 2000). When a judge is balancing under N.J.R.E. 403, the trial judge’s “discretion is a broad one.” State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978). Determinations by the trial court will not be overruled on appeal absent a “finding so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.” State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982). 
Defendant argues that the testimony of the defendant’s inappropriate behavior and excessive cursing was unduly prejudicial. However, the testimony was probative and relevant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was intoxicated. Defendant argued that she was not intoxicated and her behavior was circumstantial evidence to the contrary. 
Additionally, the trial Judge stated that hearing the testimony would not affect his opinion, that the prosecutor would not sway his opinion, and that there was no jury present to sway. 
Therefore, this Court agrees that the testimony relating to the defendant’s erratic behavior is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. 
POINT VI 
THE DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DWI ALLOWS THE COURT TO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT AS A SECOND OFFENDER ON BOTH THE DWI AND THE REFUSAL 
The defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to four (4) years license suspension for DWI in a school zone and four (4) years license suspension on the refusal to run concurrent. 12 

The State argues that although two four (4) year suspensions running concurrently was an improper sentence, the defendant should be sentenced to two two (2) year license suspensions to run consecutively. In State v. Reiner, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the heightened DWI in a school zone penalties only apply if the defendant’s prior conviction of DWI was also in a school zone. 180 N.J. 307, 318 (2004). 
In this case, defendant’s previous conviction was for DWI contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. That being the case, defendant’s conviction for DWI in a school zone merges into defendant’s DWI. Thus, defendant should be sentenced as a second offender contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. 
In State v. Frye, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that previous DWI convictions enhance the penalties on subsequent refusal convictions. 217 N.J. 566, 581-582 (2014). In that case, defendant, who had two previous DWI convictions, pled guilty to refusal. Id. at 568. Defendant was sentenced as a third time offender contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Id. 
According to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, for a second offense, “the revocation shall be consecutive to any revocation imposed for a conviction under the provisions of R.S.39:4-50.” 
As stated above, defendant has a previous DWI conviction. Therefore, defendants sentence for refusal shall be sentenced as a second offense and run consecutive to defendant’s conviction for DWI. 13 

CONCLUSION 
Based on the record below, and after oral argument and a de novo hearing, this Court finds the defendant guilty of: (1) Driving while intoxicated contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; (2) Driving while intoxicated in a school zone contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)(1); and (3) refusal contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. 
As such, this Court imposes the following penalties: 
(1) For violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, the defendant is sentenced to; 

Fine: $506 
DWI Surcharge: $100 
DDEF: $100 
Court Costs: $33 
SNSF: $75 
VCCB: $50 
IDRC: 48 hours 
Loss of D.L.: 2 years 
Ignition Interlock: 2 years 
Jail: 40 Days 
(2) For violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)(1), defendants sentence will merge with count 1; 

Fine: $506 
DWI Surcharge: $100 
DDEF Surcharge: $100 
Court Costs: $33 
SNSF: $75 
VCCB: $50 
IDRC: 12 hours 
Loss of D.L.: 1 year 
(3) For violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, defendant is sentenced to; 

Fine: $506 
DWI Surcharge: $100 
DDEF Surcharge: $100 
Court Costs: $33 
SNSF: $75 
VCCB: $50 
IDRC: 48 hours 14 

Loss of D.L.: 2 years 
Ignition Interlock: 2 years 
As per N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, defendant’s sentence for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 will run consecutive to her sentence for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Additionally, defendant has already served 40 days in the Bergen County Jail. 
______________________________ 

Date: November 21, 2014 Honorable Edward A. Jerejian, J.S.C. 

Thursday, December 11, 2014

39:4-126. Signaling before starting, turning or stopping

39:4-126.  Signaling before starting, turning or stoppingNo person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section 39:4-123, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway, or start or back a vehicle unless and until such movement can be made with safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter  provided in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.

A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

 No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear.

The signal herein required shall be given either by means of the hand and arm in the manner herein specified, or by an approved mechanical or electrical signal device, except that when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent the hand and arm signal from being visible, both to front and rear, the  signal shall be given by a device of a type which has been approved by the  division.

When the signal is given by means of the hand and arm, the driver shall indicate his intention to stop or turn by extending the hand and arm from and beyond the left side of the vehicle in the following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows:

    (a) Left turn.--Hand and arm extended horizontally.

     (b) Right turn.--Hand and arm extended upward.

     (c) Stop or decrease speed.--Hand and arm extended downward.

     Amended by L.1951, c. 23, p. 92, s. 67;  L.1956, c. 107, p. 485, s. 2.

Wednesday, December 10, 2014

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40  Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40.  No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

(2) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.

(3) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;

g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2009, c.224);

h. A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person: 

(1) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or

(2) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the person's license was suspended or revoked.

In any case where a person who owns or leases a motor vehicle knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege of the person he permits to operate the motor vehicle is suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the person also shall be subject to the following penalties: for a first or second offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both; and for a third or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, and forfeiture of the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days;

i. If the violator's driver's license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10) or for failure to comply with a time payment order, the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has paid all fines and other assessments related to the parking violation that were the subject of the Order of Suspension, or if the violator makes sufficient payments to become current with respect to payment obligations under the time payment order;

j. If a person is convicted for a second or subsequent violation of this section and the second or subsequent offense involves a motor vehicle moving violation, the term of imprisonment for the second or subsequent offense shall be 10 days longer than the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.

For the purposes of this subsection, a "motor vehicle moving violation" means any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State for which motor vehicle points are assessed by the chief administrator pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1; 2002, c.28; 2007, c.187; 2009, c.224, s.1; 2009, c.332.

39:4-97. Careless driving

Wednesday, December 3, 2014

39:3-29 License, registration certificate and insurance identification card; possession; exhibit upon request; violations; fine; defense; certain fines to Omnibus Safety Enforcement Fund.,Milltown

39:3-29  License, registration certificate and insurance identification card; possession; exhibit upon request; violations; fine; defense; certain fines to Omnibus Safety Enforcement Fund.

39:3-29. The driver's license, the registration certificate of a motor vehicle and an insurance identification card shall be in the possession of the driver or operator at all times when he is in charge of a motor vehicle on the highways of this State.

The driver or operator shall exhibit his driver's license and an insurance identification card, and the holder of a registration certificate or the operator or driver of a motor vehicle for which a registration certificate has been issued, whether or not the holder, driver or operator is a resident of this State, shall also exhibit the registration certificate, when requested so to do by a police officer or judge, while in the performance of the duties of his office, and shall write his name in the presence of the officer, so that the officer may thereby determine the identity of the licensee and at the same time determine the correctness of the registration certificate, as it relates to the registration number and number plates of the motor vehicle for which it was issued; and the correctness of the evidence of a policy of insurance, as it relates to the coverage of the motor vehicle for which it was issued.

Any person violating this section shall be subject to a fine of $150, except that if the person is a driver or operator of an omnibus, as defined pursuant to R.S.39:1-1, the amount of the fine shall be $250.  Of the amount of any such fine collected pursuant to this paragraph, $25 shall be deposited in the Uninsured Motorist Prevention Fund established by section 2 of P.L.1983, c.141 (C.39:6B-3).

If a person charged with a violation of this section can exhibit his driver's license, insurance identification card and registration certificate, which were valid on the day he was charged, to the judge of the municipal court before whom he is summoned to answer to the charge, such judge may dismiss the charge.  However, the judge may impose court costs.

In addition to and independent of any fine or other penalty provided for under law, the court shall impose a fine of $150 on any driver or operator of an omnibus, convicted of a violation of this section, who does not have a certificate of public convenience and necessity as required pursuant to R.S.48:4-3.  The State Treasurer shall annually deposit the monies collected from the fines imposed pursuant to this paragraph to the "Omnibus Safety Enforcement Fund" established pursuant to section 4 of P.L.2007, c.40 (C.39:3-79.23). The fine described herein shall not be deemed a fine, penalty, or forfeiture pursuant to R.S.39:5-41.


Amended 1972, c.200, s.1; 1981, c.242, s.1; 1983, c.403, s.10; 2003, c.89, s.78; 2007, c.40, s.2.

39:8-1 Motor vehicle inspections, exceptions.Old Bridge

39:8-1 Motor vehicle inspections, exceptions.

39:8-1. a. Every motor vehicle registered in this State which is used over any public road, street, or highway or any public or quasi-public property in this State, and every vehicle subject to enhanced inspection and maintenance programs pursuant to 40 C.F.R. s.51.356, except motorcycles, historic motor vehicles registered as such, collector motor vehicles designated as such pursuant to this subsection, and those vehicles over 8,500 pounds gross weight that are under the inspection jurisdiction of the commission pursuant to Titles 27 and 48 of the Revised Statutes, shall be inspected by designated inspectors or at official inspection facilities to be designated by the commission or at licensed private inspection facilities.  Passenger automobiles registered in accordance with R.S.39:3-4 or R.S.39:3-27 and noncommercial trucks registered in accordance with section 2 of P.L.1968, c.439 (C.39:3-8.1) or R.S.39:3-27 inspected pursuant to this section shall only be inspected for emissions and emission-related items such as emission control equipment and on-board diagnostics.  The commission shall adopt rules and regulations establishing a procedure for the designation of motor vehicles as collector motor vehicles, which designation shall include consideration by the commission of one or more of the following factors: the age of the vehicle, the number of such vehicles originally manufactured, the number of such vehicles that are currently in use, the total number of miles the vehicle has been driven, the number of miles the vehicle has been driven during the previous year or other period of time determined by the commission, and whether the vehicle has a collector classification for insurance purposes.

b. The commission shall determine the official inspection facility or private inspection facility at which a motor vehicle, depending upon its characteristics, shall be inspected.  The commission, with the concurrence of the Department of Environmental Protection, may exclude by regulation from this inspection requirement any category of motor vehicle if good cause for such exclusion exists, unless the exclusion is likely to prevent this State from meeting the applicable performance standard established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The commission may determine that a vehicle is in compliance with the inspection requirements of this section if the vehicle has been inspected and passed under a similar inspection program of another state, district, or territory of the United States.

amended 1963, c.128, s.2; 1964, c.195, s.3; 1967, c.237, s.1; 1976, c.43, s.3; 1983, c.236, s.2; 1983, c.403, s.26; 1986, c.22, s.1; 1995, c.112, s.19; 2003, c.13, s.75; 2009, c.331, s.4; 2010, c.29, s.1.

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40.  No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

(2)\In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.

(3) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;

g.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2009, c.224);

h.A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person: 

(1)  Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or

(2) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the person's license was suspended or revoked.

In any case where a person who owns or leases a motor vehicle knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege of the person he permits to operate the motor vehicle is suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the person also shall be subject to the following penalties: for a first or second offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both; and for a third or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, and forfeiture of the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days;

i. If the violator's driver's license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10) or for failure to comply with a time payment order, the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has paid all fines and other assessments related to the parking violation that were the subject of the Order of Suspension, or if the violator makes sufficient payments to become current with respect to payment obligations under the time payment order;

j. If a person is convicted for a second or subsequent violation of this section and the second or subsequent offense involves a motor vehicle moving violation, the term of imprisonment for the second or subsequent offense shall be 10 days longer than the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.

For the purposes of this subsection, a "motor vehicle moving violation" means any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State for which motor vehicle points are assessed by the chief administrator pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1; 2002, c.28; 2007, c.187; 2009, c.224, s.1; 2009, c.332.

39:8-1 Motor vehicle inspections, exceptions.

39:8-1 Motor vehicle inspections, exceptions.

39:8-1. a. Every motor vehicle registered in this State which is used over any public road, street, or highway or any public or quasi-public property in this State, and every vehicle subject to enhanced inspection and maintenance programs pursuant to 40 C.F.R. s.51.356, except motorcycles, historic motor vehicles registered as such, collector motor vehicles designated as such pursuant to this subsection, and those vehicles over 8,500 pounds gross weight that are under the inspection jurisdiction of the commission pursuant to Titles 27 and 48 of the Revised Statutes, shall be inspected by designated inspectors or at official inspection facilities to be designated by the commission or at licensed private inspection facilities.  Passenger automobiles registered in accordance with R.S.39:3-4 or R.S.39:3-27 and noncommercial trucks registered in accordance with section 2 of P.L.1968, c.439 (C.39:3-8.1) or R.S.39:3-27 inspected pursuant to this section shall only be inspected for emissions and emission-related items such as emission control equipment and on-board diagnostics.  The commission shall adopt rules and regulations establishing a procedure for the designation of motor vehicles as collector motor vehicles, which designation shall include consideration by the commission of one or more of the following factors: the age of the vehicle, the number of such vehicles originally manufactured, the number of such vehicles that are currently in use, the total number of miles the vehicle has been driven, the number of miles the vehicle has been driven during the previous year or other period of time determined by the commission, and whether the vehicle has a collector classification for insurance purposes.

b.The commission shall determine the official inspection facility or private inspection facility at which a motor vehicle, depending upon its characteristics, shall be inspected.  The commission, with the concurrence of the Department of Environmental Protection, may exclude by regulation from this inspection requirement any category of motor vehicle if good cause for such exclusion exists, unless the exclusion is likely to prevent this State from meeting the applicable performance standard established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The commission may determine that a vehicle is in compliance with the inspection requirements of this section if the vehicle has been inspected and passed under a similar inspection program of another state, district, or territory of the United States.

amended 1963, c.128, s.2; 1964, c.195, s.3; 1967, c.237, s.1; 1976, c.43, s.3; 1983, c.236, s.2; 1983, c.403, s.26; 1986, c.22, s.1; 1995, c.112, s.19; 2003, c.13, s.75; 2009, c.331, s.4; 2010, c.29, s.1.

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc. Carteret

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40.  No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a. Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b. Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c. Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d. Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e. Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f.  (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

(2) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.

(3) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;

g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2009, c.224);

h. A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person: 

(1) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or

(2) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the person's license was suspended or revoked.

In any case where a person who owns or leases a motor vehicle knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege of the person he permits to operate the motor vehicle is suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the person also shall be subject to the following penalties: for a first or second offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both; and for a third or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, and forfeiture of the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days;

i. If the violator's driver's license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10) or for failure to comply with a time payment order, the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has paid all fines and other assessments related to the parking violation that were the subject of the Order of Suspension, or if the violator makes sufficient payments to become current with respect to payment obligations under the time payment order;

j. If a person is convicted for a second or subsequent violation of this section and the second or subsequent offense involves a motor vehicle moving violation, the term of imprisonment for the second or subsequent offense shall be 10 days longer than the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.

For the purposes of this subsection, a "motor vehicle moving violation" means any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State for which motor vehicle points are assessed by the chief administrator pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1; 2002, c.28; 2007, c.187; 2009, c.224, s.1; 2009, c.332.

 

39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc. Milltown

39:3-40  Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.

39:3-40.  No person to whom a driver's license has been refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a driver's license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.

No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.

Except as provided in subsections i. and j. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

a. Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

b. Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for at least one but not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

c. Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. If the third or a subsequent offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violator's driver's license is suspended and the third or subsequent offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violator's motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);

d. Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;

e. Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;

f. (1) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section, any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

(2) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.

(3) In addition to any penalty imposed under the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;

g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2009, c.224);

h. A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person:

(1) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or

(2) Knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the person's license was suspended or revoked.

In any case where a person who owns or leases a motor vehicle knows that the operator's license or reciprocity privilege of the person he permits to operate the motor vehicle is suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the person also shall be subject to the following penalties: for a first or second offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both; and for a third or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both, and forfeiture of the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of 90 days;

i. If the violator's driver's license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10) or for failure to comply with a time payment order, the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has paid all fines and other assessments related to the parking violation that were the subject of the Order of Suspension, or if the violator makes sufficient payments to become current with respect to payment obligations under the time payment order;

j. If a person is convicted for a second or subsequent violation of this section and the second or subsequent offense involves a motor vehicle moving violation, the term of imprisonment for the second or subsequent offense shall be 10 days longer than the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense.

For the purposes of this subsection, a "motor vehicle moving violation" means any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State for which motor vehicle points are assessed by the chief administrator pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1982, c.43 (C.39:5-30.5).

amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1; 2002, c.28; 2007, c.187; 2009, c.224, s.1; 2009, c.332.

Sunday, November 30, 2014

Lenthy MVC suspension reverse JOSEPH J. CONSTANDI, JR., Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION,

Lenthy MVC suspension reverse JOSEPH J. CONSTANDI, JR.,  Appellant,  v.  NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION,  Respondent.  
 October 22, 2014   Submitted September 9, 2014 — Decided  Before Judges Reisner and Higbee.  On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-5832-12T4  Appellant Joseph J. Constandi, Jr. (Constandi) appeals from an Order of Suspension issued by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (the agency). After reviewing the facts and procedure followed in this matter, we find Constandi was entitled to a hearing to contest his suspension. We reverse and remand.
On October 15, 2012, Constandi was issued a ticket for speeding in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-98. He pled guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2, unsafe driving, under the mistaken belief that his plea would not result in any points on his driving record. Notwithstanding Constandi's belief, the offense carried a four point penalty. On May 2, 2013, Constandi was sent a Notice of Suspension, which stated his license would be suspended for 420 days because he had twelve or more points on his record. The notification also advised that he could accept the suspension or request a hearing.
Prior to the present violation, Constandi accumulated sixty points during a four decade span. More recently, his record has been less active. That information is memorialized in the attachment to the notification, which depicts his driving history from July 2009-May 2013. He received only two points in 2009 for speeding. He received zero points in 2010 or 2011; and in 2012, he received zero points and had three points deducted for safe driving. Relevant here, Constandi's record is without twelve points in a four year period. He received only six points in that time frame with a three point deduction. In light of his more recent driving history, we find that the notice of suspension was arbitrary and unsupported.
Specifically, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8a, as cited in the notice, states that the director of the agency shall suspend a driver's license for no less than thirty days, and no more than 180 days when a person accumulates twelve or more points in a two year period. Likewise, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8b allows the same suspension for accumulating over fifteen points in a period of greater than two years. In that light, there is no explanation for why Constandi's license was being suspended for 420 days. The record attached to the notice did not support a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8a.With regard to Constandi's cumulative lifetime points, although it was noted on the record, the notice makes no mention of the same, and does not state this as the reason for suspension.
After receipt of the suspension notice, Constandi filed a motion to vacate his plea in municipal court, and sent a copy of the motion to the agency with a written request for a hearing. Likewise, in a letter to the Commission dated July 2, 2013, Constandi's counsel requested discovery of his entire record, and further requested an opportunity to be heard. The written request noted that plaintiff's recollection did not match the attachment to the suspension notice.
In addition to those requests, counsel advised the agency his client had two school age children involved in sports teams, and when Constandi's license was suspended, his children would not be able to get to their athletic activities. He also advised that Constandi had been unemployed for several months, and now was working, but reported he would lose his job if he could not drive.
In response to Constandi's plea withdrawal and request for a hearing, the agency issued a second notice of suspension on June 13, 2013. This notice again stated the reason for suspension was "because you have 12 or more points on your driving record." Without explanation, and again citing N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8 as authority, this notice reduced the suspension from 420 days to 390 days. We note, this suspension was still more than double the maximum time allowed under the statute. The notice again advised of the right to a hearing.
On June 14, 2013, Constandi's counsel sent a letter to the agency that probably crossed in the mail with the notice dated June 13 from the agency to Constandi. In this letter, counsel advised the agency that Constandi had been allowed to withdraw his plea to unsafe driving, and he instead had pled to a two point speeding violation. The letter said plaintiff and counsel were waiting for a date for a suspension hearing.
On July 20, 2013, the agency replied sending a letter to counsel which was just as confusing as the prior notices had been. In this letter, the agency told plaintiff that no pre-hearing conference was necessary for the May 26, 2013 notice. The letter stated that since the violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97 (Unsafe Operation of Motor Vehicle) was amended to 39:4-98 (Speeding), the May notice no longer had any effect; the letter further stated that "as a result, your client's total point accumulation is below the 12 point threshold." This is immaterial because the record attached to both notices does not show that even the original four point violation would have exceeded the twelve point limit in less than two years. The number twelve is not relevant to the total point accumulation portion of the statute. The letter did advise plaintiff that he will be notified of a pre-hearing conference date.
On July 2, 2013, counsel for Constandi requested a hearing in writing for the third time and a complete copy of his client's driving record which he had not been given. Additionally, counsel indicated he wanted to present the personal problem issues to a hearing examiner, and question the contents of the record. Eight days later, on July 10, 2013, with no response to counsel's request for a copy of the records relied upon by the agency and no hearing having been held, the agency issued an Order of Suspension and a Denial of Hearing Request/Final Decision signed by the Chairman of the agency.
The final order for the first time stated that Constandi's driving license was being suspended because the two point speeding ticket caused his total point accumulation to be fifty-eight points in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8b.The order denied a hearing because "no material facts or legal issues are in dispute" and the request for a hearing was based merely on "personal hardship." The order further stated that based on his driving record and mitigating circumstances, the suspension was being reduced from 390 days to 150 days. Finally, the order also noted that "suspension of your driving privilege is intended to be rehabilitative rather than punitive."
Appellate review of an administrative agency's action is limited. On appeal, we are required to give deference to agency decisions, but not where they are arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Circus Liquors Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp.199 N.J. 19, 27 (2007); In re Carter191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007).
It is well-settled that without a "clear showing" that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record, an administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision should be sustained, regardless of whether a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance. In re Herrman192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that arbitrary and capricious means "willful and unreasonable action, without consideration and in disregard of the circumstances." Worthington v. Fauver88 N.J. 183, 204-05 (1982).
Based on this deferential standard courts have accorded a presumption of validity and reasonableness to agency action, therefore placing the burden on the challenger to overcome this presumption. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Department of Human Serv.96 N.J. 456, 477 (1984). In this case, plaintiff has met his burden.
Here, we agree with plaintiff that a response to his discovery request should have been provided. If he was suspended based on points over his entire record, a copy of his entire record should have been attached to the notice, not just his record for the prior four years. The limited attachment did not contain sufficient evidence to even support a suspension.
The agency's actions in suspending Constandi's license for 150 days without a hearing was arbitrary, capricious and in violation of the law. Constandi was entitled to be advised of the specific reason for his suspension. Constandi was not advised of the actual reason for his suspension until he received the final order. The denial of a hearing was in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8c which gives the licensee the right to a hearing before an administrative law judge to evaluate the appropriateness of a suspension in excess of thirty days, and allows relevant evidence which would include a personal hardships to be considered on the length of a suspension in excess of thirty days.
Specifically, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8 states a suspension shall become effective unless the licensee notifies the director in writing of his intention to personally appear at a hearing to challenge the suspension. The statute further states:
The administrative law judge presiding at a hearing held pursuant to this section shall only consider evidence of the actual number of points assessed and the period of time during which such points were accumulated, taking into consideration any point reduction credits earned by the licensee, in issuing a suspension. He may consider other relevant evidence in considering the appropriateness of any portion of a suspension issued in excess of 30 days.

It was arbitrary to dismiss plaintiff's three written requests for a hearing. It was arbitrary and violated the applicable law to initially impose suspensions far in excess of the maximum time allowed by law. It was arbitrary to not provide plaintiff with a complete copy of his record, or advise him of how he could obtain it.
Constandi has a right to a hearing before any suspension in excess of thirty days is imposed. At that hearing, the administrative law judge can consider the time frames involved, the number of violations and points, the claimed hardship, the nature of the violations, and all relevant facts as allowed by the statute to the issue of the appropriateness of a suspension in excess of thirty days.
Reversed and remanded.