Saturday, January 25, 2014

Failure by State Police to create and maintain a centralized statewide database not a violation of the Supreme Court Chun Order. State v Chun 215 NJ 489 (2013)

Failure by State Police to create and maintain a centralized statewide database not a violation of the Supreme Court Chun Order. 
State v Chun 215 NJ 489 (2013)   
          The Supreme Court on March 17, 2008 issued it’s unanimous opinion addressing the challenges raised by defendants to the scientific reliability of the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C (the Alcotest).
     The defendant drivers moved for an Order in Aid of Litigants’ Rights, see R. 1:10-3, contending that the State has failed to comply with this Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, principally by failing to create and maintain a centralized statewide database, and asserting more specifically that the database lacks integrity because it differs from the manner in which data was previously stored on and available on CD-ROM, is incomplete as to certain types of files and calibration cycles, is presented in a format different from the one noted in the report of the Special Master, and is subject to the third-party software developer’s fee,
     The defendants requested that the NJ Supreme Court deem the State to have violated the March 17, 2008, Order and that The Supreme Court therefore direct the State to redesign the database to comply with defendants’ understanding of the meaning and intent of this Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, and that the Supreme Court further direct the State to ensure the integrity of the data in the database and order other relief.
     The Attorney General’s office responded to the factual assertions concerning the integrity and operation of the centralized statewide database raised by defendants through the affidavits of Howard J. Baum, Ph.D., Director of the Office of Forensic Sciences (OFS), a Division of the New Jersey State Police, and of Ali M. Alaouie, Ph.D., an OFS research scientist charged with oversight and monitoring of Alcotest data downloads and database integrity.
     The Attorney General’s office moved for it’s own Order in Aid of Litigant’s Rights seeking to modify the Court’s March 17, 2008, Order and to authorize the State to continue to utilize the Alcotest with Firmware version 3.11, which was evaluated during the proceedings that led to The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Opinion and Order.
     The Attorney General’s office requested that the State be relieved of further compliance with Paragraph 2 of this Court’s Order of March 17, 2008, based on the State’s representation that Firmware 3.13, which is the Alcotest software that was created in conjunction with Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. (Draeger), the manufacturer and supplier of the Alcotest, in compliance with Paragraph 2 of The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, would effectively render the previously created database unusable and unworkable.
     The Attorney General’s office represented to the Court that Draeger has advised that the Alcotest will no longer be serviceable after 2016 and that the State is now in the process of evaluating alternate breath testing devices for implementation.
     The defendant also moved for an Order in Aid of Litigants’ Rights, see R. 1:10-3, contending that, absent compliance with Paragraph 2 of the Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, which directed that the specified software changes be made “forthwith”, the Alcotest is unsuitable for use in New Jersey, and should not be used.
      The defendants challenged the reliability of the Alcotest 7110 utilizing Firmware version 3.11 both in general and in particular through reiteration of and expansion upon arguments raised during the proceedings that led to this Court’s March 17, 2008, Opinion, including defendant’s challenge to the Firmware’s utilization of the fuel cell drift algorithm and the absence of implementation of software to account for the demonstrated physiological differences that impede the ability of women over the age of sixty to provide a sufficient breath sample and that therefore raised the specter of inappropriate charges being brought against such women for refusal, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4.
     The defendants requested that the Supreme Court declare that the Alcotest is not sufficiently scientifically reliable to be utilized in any prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendants were denied most of the relief they sought.
          The Supreme Court concluded that the centralized statewide database was fully in compliance with this Court’s Order of March 17, 2008, in all respects.
          The Supreme Court concluded that defendants have failed to demonstrate that the State has “willfully refused” to comply with The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, see Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 141 n.2 (2006), and that the State has demonstrated that in spite of its best efforts to do so, it does not have the ability to comply with Paragraph 2 of the Order, see Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.366, 392 (1995), because of the unanticipated but unavoidable adverse impact of compliance that the implementation of Firmware version 3.13 would have upon the continued viability of the existing database.
     The Supreme Court concluded that the Alcotest 7110, utilizing Firmware version 3.11, remains scientifically reliable, and generates results that are admissible to prove a per se violation of the statutory prohibitions on driving while under the influence of alcohol, when those results are utilized in strict compliance with Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and the associated worksheets attached to this Court’s March 17, 2008, Order.
          The Supreme Court concluded that although Paragraph 1(A)(3) of the Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order directed that certain AIR results be inadmissible in prosecutions of women over the age of sixty for violations of the refusal statute, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, a further remedy is now necessary to protect the equal protection rights of women falling into that category.
     The Supreme Court therefore held:
     1.  IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motions including to stop use of Alcotest was denied; and
     2.  IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion, M-1539, for relief from further compliance with Paragraph 2 of The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order is granted; and
     3.  IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion, M-1539, for authorization to continue to utilize the Alcotest 7110 with Firmware version 3.11, and to deem the results admissible in accordance with The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order and associated worksheets, with the exception of the provisions of Paragraph 2 thereof, is granted; and

     4.  IT IS ORDERED that, in addition to the directive in Paragraph 1(A)(3) of The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, concerning admissibility of Alcotest results for women over the age of 60 in prosecutions for refusal, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, if the only evidence of refusal is the inadmissible AIR, such women may not be charged with, prosecuted for, or convicted of that offense.

Tuesday, January 21, 2014

39:4-36 Failure to yield to pedestrians, exceptions; violations, penalties.

39:4-36   Failure to yield to pedestrians, exceptions; violations, penalties.

39:4-36  a. The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except at crosswalks when the movement of traffic is being regulated by police officers or traffic control signals, or where otherwise regulated by municipal, county, or State regulation, and except where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided:

(1)The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a marked crosswalk, when the pedestrian is upon, or within one lane of, the half of the roadway, upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning.  As used in this paragraph, "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes conveying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway.

(2)No pedestrian shall leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield or stop.

(3)Whenever any vehicle is stopped to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

(4)Every pedestrian upon a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.

(5)Nothing contained herein shall relieve a driver from the duty to exercise due care for the safety of any pedestrian upon a roadway. Nothing contained herein shall relieve a pedestrian from using due care for his safety.

b.A person violating any paragraph of subsection a. of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, pay a fine to be imposed by the court in the amount of $200.  The court may also impose upon a person violating any paragraph of subsection a. of this section, a penalty of community service not to exceed 15 days in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate.  If the violation results in serious bodily injury to a pedestrian, the person convicted of the violation shall be subject to a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500, and may additionally be subject to a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 25 days, or a license suspension not to exceed six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.  As used in this section, "serious bodily injury" means serious bodily injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1.

c.Of each fine imposed and collected pursuant to subsection b. of this section, $100 shall be forwarded to the State Treasurer who shall annually deposit the moneys into the "Pedestrian Safety Enforcement and Education Fund" created by section 1 of P.L.2005, c.86 (C.39:4-36.2).

d.In the event of a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian within a marked crosswalk, or at an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, there shall be a permissive inference that the driver did not exercise due care for the safety of the pedestrian.