Thursday, October 19, 2017

Review of the Major Municipal Court Cases 2016-2017 Middlesex County Bar Association Seminar MCBA Tuesday, November 21, 2017

Tuesday, November 21, 2017 Municipal Court Practice CLE Seminar 
2:00 PM until 4:00 PM 
Where: MCBA Office 87 Bayard Street New Brunswick, New Jersey  08901
Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq.

David Spevack, Esq.
Prosecutor - Carteret, Edison & Woodbridge




Edison
David Spevack, Esq.
Prosecutor - Carteret, Edison & Woodbridge




                                                                                               
Cost: $25-Law Clerks; $35-MCBA Young Lawyers; $40-MCBA Members; and $75-All Other   To  register
      or Call 732.828.3433, x. 102

Index to Major cases to be discussed by Ken Vercammen and David Spevack at seminar

 

1. DWI Refusal notice withstands challenge. State v Quintero

443 NJ Super. 620 (App. Div. 2016)

2. Sup Mt denied where police looking in house for missing dementia patient found pot plants State v Mordente

444 NJ Super. 393 (App. Div. 2016)

3. Police video is public record under OPRA 

Paff v Ocean County Prosecutors Office

446 NJ Super. 163 (App. Div. 2016)

5. No Jury trial for DWI. State v. Denelsbeck

223 NJ 103 (2016)

6. Police can stop for one broken taillight out of 4

State v. Sutherland

445 NJ Super. 358 (App. Div. 2016)

7. US Supreme Court permits DWI breath tests but rejects blood test without warrant.

Birchfield v. North Dakota  136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)

8. Out of state DWI counts for criminal driving while suspended. State v. Luzhak 

445 NJ Super. 241 (App.Div. 2016)
9. Prosecutor must provide videotape and audiotape plus names of officers from other towns involved in stop State v. Stein 225 NJ 582 (2016)

10. Suppression granted where stop based only for high beam not affecting driving State v. Scriven

226 NJ 20 (2016) 

12. Driver with prior school zone DWI sentenced as 2nd Offender. State v. Wheatley

447 NJ Super. 532 (App. Div. 2016

13. Town outside surveillance camera not subject to OPRA but maybe subject to common law. Gilleran v. Township of Bloomfield

14. Twitter statement admissible in criminal trials. State v Hannah

448 NJ Super. 78 (App. Div. 2016)

15. No obstruction charge for failure to provide DL for parking ticket. State v Powers 448 NJ Super. 69 (App. Div. 2016)

16. School Zone map admissible if properly authenticated State v.  Wilson 227 NJ 34 (2017)

17 Municipal Court can stay DL suspension after DWI if appeal
 State v. Robertson 228 NJ 138 (2017)
18. DNA on towel not admissible without proper foundation and chain of custody
State v Mauti 208 NJ 519 (2017)
19. Defendant’s furtive movement after car stop justified removal of Passenger State v. Bacome __ NJ __ (2017) (A-9-15)

20. Plain feel search not permitted with strip search for DP State v Evans  449 NJ Super. 66 (App. Div. 2017)
21 Dash cam video in fatal shooting public record
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst 
__ NJ __ 2017 a-35-15
21. Errors by police in warrant and search held ok by court
State v Hamlett
22. Dash cam video in fatal shooting public record
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst
23. Police have duty to preserve video and evidence
State v Richardson
24. Mandatory DNA samples in serious Municipal court criminal
 Effective July 1, 2017 person who pleads guilty to cds and assault criminal disorderly criminal offenses must provide a DNA sample upon a guilty plea.

25. New Criminal rules effective Jan 1, 2017
26. New Court Rule: The Committee proposed two new rules to provide
limitations on the monetary sanctions
27  New Expungement Law
New law effective April 18, 2016 for dismissed cases

This program has been approved by the Board on Continuing Legal Education of the Supreme Court of New Jersey for 2.0 hours of total CLE credit. Of these, 2.0 credits qualify for certification in municipal court law.

See more at:

https://www.facebook.com/events/1398826876901278

Sunday, October 15, 2017

speedy trial vio where 22 month delay STATE v PETRUZZIELLO,

speedy trial vio where 22 month delay
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ADAM J. PETRUZZIELLO,

Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
June 27, 2017
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.


SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0 

Before Judges Espinosa and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 15-035.

Levow DWI Law, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Evan M. Levow, of counsel and on the brief).

Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Erin Smith Wisloff, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Adam J. Petruzziello (defendant) appeals a December 21, 2015 order, which denied his request to dismiss a driving while intoxicated conviction on speedy trial grounds. We reverse the conviction. 
In September 2013, defendant sustained significant injuries when the motorcycle he was operating struck a parked truck. He was charged with driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; failure to maintain a lane, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88; and speeding, N.J.S.A. 39:4-98. 
The case was transferred to the Morris County Prosecutor's Office (the prosecutor's office) in early October 2013, within weeks of the accident, for investigation and possible presentment to the Grand Jury. The record provides no information about the course of that investigation, but no additional charges were brought against defendant. 
In September 2014, a Superior Court judge remanded jurisdiction of the case to the Rockaway Township Municipal Court. It is unexplained why the remand was not recorded until November 2014. Defendant's first appearance on the September 2013 charges was in January 2015, when he pled not guilty. The parties were in court on discovery issues in April and June. Defendant did not raise the speedy trial violation claim until June 4, 2015. The motion was denied on July 22, 2015, and defendant pled guilty to driving while under the influence, conditioned on the outcome of the appeal. The other charges were dismissed. 
Defendant appealed this conviction, which was heard de novo in the trial court. On December 21, 2015, the trial court rejected defendant's claimed speedy trial violation, and sentenced him to a ninety-day suspension of his driver's license, fines, court costs, penalties and a surcharge, which was the same sentence imposed by the municipal court judge.1
The Superior Court found defendant's injuries did not cause delay in the case. The twenty-two month delay was attributable "at least in the first instance to a review by the Morris County Prosecutor's Office," for investigation. The trial court did not know whether the "delay [was] caused simply by the bureaucratic miasma in the prosecutor's office or some further detailed investigation." Nevertheless, the trial court found there was "no indication" the delay was due to inattention by the prosecutor. Further, there was "no evidence of a deliberate attempt by the State to gain an advantage over the defendant by reason of the delay." The trial court stated the State was prejudiced by delay because it had to prove its case through "observation" and not through blood alcohol results. 
The trial court found defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until June 4, 2015, which was "a significant factor in weighing the delay in this case, and its impact on the defendant." It also found defendant "may have suffered some anxiety" while the charges were pending, but there was no evidence of "employment interruptions," "public ridicule or scorn or negative status" because of these charges, nor "indication of actual prejudice." The trial court did not find the delay oppressive or that defendant's "speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment were significantly impacted." 
Defendant's appeal raises these issues:
POINT I: SINCE APPELLANT WAS THE ONLY ONE INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT, AND NO CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED, THERE WAS NO VALID REASON TO HAVE TRANSFERRED THIS CASE TO THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, OR FOR IT TO HAVE LANGUISHED THERE FOR ALMOST A YEAR, BEFORE BEING SENT BACK TO THE MUNICIPAL COURT AND RESOLVED 677 DAYS AFTER APPELLANT'S ARREST, THIS CASE MUST BE DISMISSED. 

POINT II: THE LAW DIVISION'S RELIANCE ON STATE V. ALEXANDER,2 WHICH INVOLVES PRE-ARREST AND PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY, IS MISPLACED: STATE V. CAHILL3 IS CONTROLLING AND REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF THIS MATTER. 
Defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. That right applies "to quasi-criminal matters pending in the municipal courts," such as driving while intoxicated cases.  State v. Cahillsupra, 213 N.J. at 267. When evaluating whether defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, four factors must be reviewed and balanced, including: (1) length of delay, (2) reasons for delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of a speedy trial claim, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.  Barker v. Wingo407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972). The Court adopted these factors in Cahillsupra, 213 N.J. at 266. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is different from the timeframe under the Due Process Clause for "initiating a criminal prosecution after discovering an offense has been committed."  State v. Aguirre287 N.J. Super. 128, 131-32 (App. Div.) (citing United States v. Lovasco431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L. Ed.2d 752, 758 (1977)) (other citation omitted), certif. denied144 N.J. 585 (1996). "[P]re-indictment or pre-arrest delay [is] measured by a far more rigorous standard."  Id. at 132. "In order to prevail, a defendant must demonstrate 'both that (1) there was no legitimate reason for the delay and (2) [defendant] was prejudiced thereby.'"  Ibid. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
The distinction arises from the different interests which are protected.  Id. at 133. With respect to speedy trial claims,
arrest or indictment is a public act that may severely interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether or not he is free on bail, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, create anxiety and subject him to public obloquy. In contrast, the Due Process Clause in the context of pre-indictment or pre-arrest delay is confined to protecting the ability of the defendant to mount a defense against the prosecution's charges.

[Ibid. (citation omitted).] 
The trial court erroneously conflated the speedy trial and due process analyses. In analyzing Barker factor two, the "reason for delay," the trial court focused on whether the State had attempted to gain an advantage over the defendant by its delay, a concern expressed under the due process line of cases. In analyzing Barker factor four, whether defendant was prejudiced, the court concluded defendant had not demonstrated any "actual" prejudice, which is part of the due process analysis. 
Under Barker, there is no "bright-line rule" to determine whether the delay in a case is excessive.  Cahillsupra, 213 N.J. at 258, 277. A delay exceeding one year prompts our review of the other Barker factors.  Id. at 266. 
The delay here was twenty-two months measured from the date of the charges (September 2013) to the date of the guilty plea (July 2015). Id. at 272 (calculating "length of the delay" from the filing of charges "to the notice of trial in the municipal court of the remanded charge[s]"). Fourteen months of the delay occurred when the case was at the prosecutor's office for investigation and before it was recorded by the municipal court in November 2014. The court found, without support in the record, there was no evidence of inattention by the prosecutor's office. In fact, there was no evidence of attention or inattention. Defendant acknowledged the remaining six-month delay, from January to June 2015, was attributable to defense initiated discovery issues. Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until June 4, 2015. Then, although the trial court found prejudice to defendant based on anxiety suffered waiting for the case to be heard while the charges were pending, it then asserted defendant had not shown "actual" prejudice. 
We are constrained to reverse because the trial court raised the bar too high for defendant. Because defendant had not shown actual prejudice beyond anxiety, or proof that the State was trying to gain advantage over him by delaying the case, which are factors under the Due Process Clause, it discounted the excessive twenty-two month delay and the prejudice to defendant by the length of the delay. In Cahill, the court found a sixteen-month delay too long when the case was not complicated, there was no justification for the delay, and defendant's only proof of prejudice was anxiety.  Id. at 273-75. Under these facts where the record bespeaks of no complexity, the case is similar to Cahill, requiring dismissal of the charges. 
Reversed.

1  We understand defendant has served the suspension. The record does not provide whether the monetary amounts were paid.
2  Reference is to State v. Alexander310 N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div. 1998).


3
 Reference is to State v. Cahill213 N.J. 253 (2013). 

Rear end hit and accident does not always mean careless driving STATE v. DUKE NYANGWESO,

Rear end hit and accident does not always mean careless driving
            STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
     Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DUKE NYANGWESO,
     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________     NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2500-15T3
Submitted February 14, 2017 Decided July 20, 2017
          Before Judges Rothstadt and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Municipal Appeal No. 11-5.
Beninato & Matrafajlo, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant (Dan T. Matrafajlo, on the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Duke Nyangweso was convicted in municipal court for

careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. He appealed and after a trial
page1image11936
de novo in the Law Division, he was again convicted on January 15, 2016. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
On March 3, 2015, defendant was issued a summons for careless driving by a New Jersey State Trooper. He later pled not guilty, and trial was conducted in Bayonne Municipal Court. The State
presented the testimony of one witness, Cassandra Defendant did not present any witnesses.
     Markman testified that:
I was driving across the [Bayonne Bridge] at seven, . . . something in the morning. I looked in my rear view mirror. Traffic was pretty far behind me. The next thing I know traffic is slowing down and I get hit from the rear, which in turn caused me to hit another car in front of me. I get out of my car and I go around and I look and I see my bumper is hanging a little in the back.
Markman.
Markman also identified defendant in court as the driver of the vehicle that rear-ended her.
Following the parties' summation, the municipal court judge found defendant guilty of careless driving. The judge rejected defendant's argument that Markman's testimony did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty. The judge found Markman to be credible, and determined that her testimony proved defendant was not operating his car with care when he hit Markman's car in the rear as she was slowing down in traffic on the Bayonne Bridge.
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A-2500-15T3
Upon a trial de novo on the record, the Law Division judge found defendant guilty anew. Defendant contended there was no evidence indicating that he was inattentive and drove carelessly, and that the municipal court found him guilty based upon the theory of res ipsa loquitor the sole fact that he rear-ended Markman, constituted careless driving. The Law Division judge was unpersuaded, and determined that the municipal court did not apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in finding defendant guilty. He ruled:
The accident itself, the impact, is direct evidence. The circumstantial evidence is what led up to it. This would not have occurred but for the fact that the defendant was inattentive, which in my mind means the same as without due caution and circumspection, right, and frankly, that's what this [c]ourt finds and it fits within the definition of careless driving.
The [municipal court] stated and with these transcripts, it's always a little difficult, defendant had or should have had [complete] control of his vehicle, that means complete control, I believe . . . if he had total and complete control of his vehicle, he wouldn't have bumped into anything.
This appeal followed.
     Before us, defendant argues:
POINT ONE
[THE] BURDEN OF PROOF IS UPON THE STATE TO PROVE EACH ELEMENT OF CARELESS DRIVING.

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A-2500-15T3
POINT TWO
THE [LAW DIVISION] CLEARLY MISINTERPRETED THE CARELESS DRIVING STATUTE.

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the findings by the Law Division judge could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the record, giving due deference to the credibility assessments of the municipal court judge and considering the proofs as a whole. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)). However, we review legal issues de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).
Citing State v. Lutz, 309 N.J. Super. 317, 326-27 (App. Div. 1998), and State v. Wenzel, 113 N.J. Super. 215, 217 (App. Div. 1971), defendant contends that the Law Division inappropriately applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in finding him guilty of careless driving merely because he rear-ended Markman's vehicle.
In Wenzel, we reversed the defendant's conviction based on what amounted to the "res ipsa doctrine," which "has no place in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, where the burden is totally on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant violated a penal (or quasi-penal) statute." Id. at 218. There, the defendant was charged with careless driving when his tractor-trailer jackknifed and struck another vehicle. Id. at
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216. The State's only witness, a police officer, did not see the accident and there was no evidence establishing that the defendant drove without due caution or circumspection. Id. at 216-17. Nonetheless, both the municipal court and the Law Division determined that an otherwise unexplained jackknifing of a truck was sufficient to establish careless driving. Id. at 217. We disagreed, concluding there was no testimony that the defendant was speeding, or that he had driven carelessly. Id. at 217-18.
Relying upon our precedent in Wenzel, we concluded in Lutz, that the municipal court and the Law Division judges improperly applied a res ipsa loquitur analysis in finding the defendant guilty of careless driving. Lutz, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 326. We noted, "other than the [car] accident itself, the State only presented [the] defendant's statement that his vehicle began to slide on the wet highway and continued to do so when he tapped his brakes." Id. at 327.
The underlying principles of Lutz and Wenzel apply here. A person who drives "a vehicle carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of careless driving." N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. The only evidence presented by the State was Markman's testimony that defendant rear-ended her vehicle as she was slowing down on the bridge. We conclude there
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A-2500-15T3

is no support in the record for the Law Division's finding that Markman's testimony was sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty of careless driving.
Contrary to the Law Division's statement that its decision was not based upon res ipsa loquitor, it effectively applied that standard. The mere fact that a collision occurred does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was inattentive or driving carelessly. Given that the State Trooper did not testify, there was no indication what observations he made at the accident scene, or any statements made by defendant, that influenced his decision to issue defendant a summons for careless driving. As in Lutz, "[t]he State presented no evidence indicating that defendant had been speeding, driving too fast for the wet road conditions, distracted or otherwise driving without due caution and circumspection." Lutz, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 327. Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for careless driving.
Reversed and remanded to the Law Division for an entry of an order vacating defendant's conviction.

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